Dignity for all?
In the context of the 75th anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Holy See has published the Declaration Dignitas infinita, on the dignity of the human being. In the document issued by the Dicastery for the Doctrine of the Faith, the Church seeks to once again proclaim the equal dignity of all human beings (para. 17). Starting from the distinction between various levels of dignity (ontological dignity, moral dignity, social dignity, and existential dignity) (para. 7), the text emphasizes the need to take the broadest and most fundamental dimension of dignity as the starting point. Ontological dignity pertains to the person by virtue of mere existence and is not granted by others based on certain qualities but is instead founded “on the intrinsic worth of their being” (para. 33). This is the only dignity that truly belongs to all human beings, regardless of whether or not they are capable of adequately expressing it (para. 15). It is also the only inalienable dignity, deserving of unconditional respect (para. 24).
The document criticizes some distortions of the meaning of human dignity, specifically the reductive, individualistic, and utilitarian concepts of dignity. Indeed, for some, not every human being qualifies as a person, but only those capable of reasoning and acting freely. Dignity is also based on the psychophysical well-being of the individual. According to this reductive concept, there would be no human dignity, but only “personal dignity,” meaning that the unborn child, the incapacitated elderly, or those with mental disabilities would lack dignity (para. 24). In this reductive context, dignity is identified with isolated and individualistic freedom, manifested in the ability to fulfill each individual preference or subjective desire. This perspective seeks to justify an arbitrary multitude of “new rights,” which are to be guaranteed and funded by the community (para. 25).
Dignity understood in this way is not truly dignity for all, but only for those who meet certain standards, requirements, or conditions. This raises issues as serious as they are irresolvable: Who is authorized to make this judgment? Who grants the authority to recognize or deny personal dignity to another human being? The Church, on the contrary, asserts that dignity belongs to every human person and remains “in all circumstances,” as its recognition cannot depend on someone's judgment of their condition as a person (para. 24).
Interconnection and Relational Character of Human Rights
Human rights are for everyone, at all times. In modern culture, the closest reference to the principle of the inalienable dignity of the person is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (para. 23). Moreover, as stated in the Vienna Declaration (1993), human rights are universal, indivisible, and interdependent, so that affirming one means affirming the others.[1]
Dignitas infinita highlights the interrelation of human rights by emphasizing the relational nature of the person and their dignity (paras. 26-28). At the same time, it emphasizes the risks of an individualistic approach to fundamental rights. Human dignity also includes the capacity to assume obligations towards others (para. 27), surpassing the reductive perspective of self-referential freedom that seeks to create values independently of relationships with others and belonging to a community (para. 26). In contrast, the dominant individualism in many areas of society risks limiting human dignity to the ability to make discretionary decisions about oneself and one's own destiny, independently of others. In this erroneous conception of freedom, duties and rights cannot be mutually recognized to care for one another (para. 26). If society is primarily governed by the criteria of market freedom and efficiency, human fraternity becomes, in fact, an unattainable chimera (para. 31), as Pope Francis extensively noted in his encyclical letter Fratelli tutti. The individualistic perspective in the interpretation of human rights not only contradicts the intrinsically relational nature of the human being, but it also inevitably leads to contradictions in the application of human rights. In other words, the individualistic view of the human person and their rights almost inevitably leads to a social model in which human rights are not equal for everyone,[2] such that the rights of some end up being used as “weapons” against others.
Weaponizing human rights?
The document includes in its second part references to some of the most severe violations of human dignity that we witness today. In this commentary, I will specifically address two of these aspects, abortion and surrogacy, in which the contradictory phenomenon of “human rights in opposition” is very evident.
Those who seek to justify abortion focus their argument on the supposed defense of women's rights, while the rights of the unborn child remain entirely overlooked. Perhaps this is why ambiguous terminology, such as the expression “interruption of pregnancy,” is used, which tends to obscure or mitigate its severity in social consciousness (para. 47).
If every human being possesses ontological dignity, they are sacred and inviolable in any situation and at every stage of their development. Therefore, the Church asserts the dignity and rights of all (both women and unborn children) as an indispensable foundation for the protection of personal and social existence. Contrary to what some might think, in condemning abortion, the Church does not deny the legitimate rights of women.[3] Rather, it asserts that the safeguarding of these rights cannot come at the cost of ignoring the rights of the unborn, who are ends in themselves and never mere means to resolve the difficulties of others (para. 47). If affirming the dignity and rights of women implies denying those of the unborn, are we not facing an irresolvable contradiction within human rights? What possibility do we have to affirm the dignity and rights of all when the rights of some, perhaps the most vulnerable and voiceless, are so easily forgotten?
On the other hand, in so-called “surrogacy,” a supposed “right to a child” claimed by adults, conflicts not only with the rights of children but also with the dignity of the surrogate mother. This practice benefits those who profit from it, turning it into a global bussiness.
Dignitas infinita asserts that the practice of surrogacy primarily violates the dignity of the child, who has the right to a fully human origin, as a gift bestowed upon spouses and never as the object of a contract (para. 48). Therefore, the legitimate desire to have a child cannot be transformed into a “right” that disregards the dignity of the child as the recipient of the free gift of life (para. 49). This practice also violates the dignity of the woman, who becomes detached from the child growing within her and is reduced to a means subjected to the arbitrary desires of others. In fact, these contracts often grant commissioning parents extensive control over the gestational mother, encompassing her body, health, privacy, and decision-making, even extending to end-of-life matters. It's important to recognize that this isn't just about “renting a womb”; rather, it involves renting the entire person, both physically and spiritually. Moreover, it's harmful to the child, who misses out on maternal bonding and is treated as a commodity exchanged for money. This contradicts the fundamental dignity of every human being, who should always be recognized as an end in themselves and never as a means to an end (para. 50).
The contradictions are also evident in advanced democracies that are based on respect for human rights. Despite the Annual report on human rights and democracy in the world 2014 and the EU policy on the matter explicitly condemning surrogacy as contrary to the dignity of women and recommending its prohibition among EU member states, a recent proposal for EU regulation on Cross-border family situations and recognition of parenthood has attempted to indirectly legitimize this practice, ostensibly with the intention of protecting the rights of children born through surrogacy. This move raises doubts about its intention to protect the rights of children born through surrogacy. Indirectly, this proposal would normalize practices that contradict the fundamental rights of the EU (Art. 3). There appears to be a kind of “double game” or “double standard” regarding this issue. This controversy has sparked movements. Some seek to legitimize these contracts through an International Convention, mainly benefiting those involved in the business, while others advocate for the dignity of all parties involved and push for their complete international abolition as the Declaration of Casablanca for the Universal Abolition of Surrogacy, of 5 march 2023.
Conclusion
The liberal and capitalist individualism tends to attribute dignity only to those who enjoy individual freedom, who are useful, or who can maintain certain standards of living. However, human rights framed from this perspective are often wielded as a destructive weapon against the rights of others, typically the weakest and most vulnerable. If conviction about the value of each human being diminishes, human rights become subject to the circumstantial conveniences of those in power (para. 47). Conversely, when the foundation of rights is ontological dignity, rooted in personal being, it becomes possible to affirm, respect, and harmonize rights for everyone. In Dignitas infinita, the Church proclaims the dignity of all human beings, and thus “ardently urges that respect for the dignity of the human person beyond all circumstances be placed at the center of the commitment to the common good and at the center of every legal system.” (para 64).
[1] Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 25 June 1993. A Doc. A/CONF.157/23, para 5.
[2] Francis, Encyclical Letter Fratelli tutti on fraternity and social friendship, 3 October 2020, para. 22.
[3] The Church has repeatedly spoken on the dignity of women and their equality of rights in society. The most comprehensive documents on the subject are from John Paul II: the Apostolic Letter Mulieris dignitatem, August 15 1988, and the Letter to Women, June 29 1995.
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