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Competence Creep in EU Migration and Asylum Policy, Part I

34 minutes ago
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Emergency, Solidarity and the Constitutional Shift After 2015


Lajos Levente Cserba, PhD Student, University of Miskolc, Hungary

Roland Lindt, Assistant Professor, University of Miskolc, Hungary



Migration is one of the most politically sensitive areas of European integration. It concerns not only humanitarian responsibility and administrative capacity, but also border control, public order, social cohesion, labour-market choices and the long-term composition of national political communities. It is therefore one of the clearest fields in which the constitutional limits of EU action are tested. The European Union is founded on the principle of conferral: under Article 5(2) TEU, it may act only within the limits of the competences conferred upon it by the Member States in the Treaties, while competences not so conferred remain with the Member States. This rule is complemented by subsidiarity and proportionality, which require that Union action be justified and not exceed what is necessary.[1] Yet the practical distribution of authority in the EU is not shaped only by formal Treaty amendment. It is also shaped by secondary legislation, emergency measures, institutional practice, Commission supervision, soft-law expectations and the case law of the Court of Justice. Through these channels, the European Union may acquire practical influence in areas where its formal mandate remains limited, shared or contested. This gradual expansion is commonly described as competence creep.

In migration and asylum policy, competence creep is particularly visible because the Treaties contain a delicate compromise. Articles 77 to 79 TFEU allow common rules on external border controls, asylum, subsidiary protection, temporary protection, immigration, irregular migration and return. Such rules are necessary for an area without internal border controls and for a functioning Common European Asylum System. At the same time, the Treaties do not create a general EU competence over migration policy as a whole. Article 79(5) TFEU expressly preserves the right of Member States to determine the volumes of admission of third-country nationals coming from third countries to seek work. Article 79(4) TFEU allows the European Union to support integration measures but excludes harmonisation of Member State laws in that field. Article 72 TFEU further confirms that Title V of the TFEU does not affect Member States’ responsibilities for maintaining law and order and safeguarding internal security. This Treaty structure reflects a constitutional balance: the European Union may act where coordination is necessary, while Member States retain responsibility for admission, integration, internal security and public order. Competence creep begins when that balance is gradually reinterpreted in practice.

The first mechanism of such reinterpretation is conceptual. EU migration discourse increasingly relies on the broad language of ‘migration management’. At first sight, this appears neutral and technocratic; legally, however, it is not without consequence. Migration management tends to merge categories that EU law and the Treaties treat differently: asylum seekers, refugees, irregular migrants, labour migrants, legally resident third-country nationals and persons subject to return procedures. Asylum law concerns protection against persecution or serious harm; labour migration concerns national decisions about admission and economic policy; border protection concerns territorial control and public order; return policy concerns the enforcement of decisions regarding irregularly staying third-country nationals. Integration policy remains an area where harmonisation is expressly excluded. If all of these questions are absorbed into one broad concept of migration management, the limits of Union competence become easier to blur. Political language can change legal perception: measures affecting different legal fields may then be justified by a general need for European solutions rather than by the specific Treaty basis that actually authorises EU action.

The second mechanism is the use of emergency law. The 2015 migration crisis was decisive. In response to the pressure on Greece and Italy, the Council adopted provisional relocation measures, including Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601, which provided for the relocation of applicants for international protection from those Member States to other Member States.[2] The legal basis was Article 78(3) TFEU, which allows the Council, on a proposal from the Commission and after consulting the European Parliament, to adopt provisional measures for the benefit of Member States confronted by an emergency situation characterised by a sudden inflow of third-country nationals. Its structure is exceptional, provisional and crisis-based. The relocation decision nevertheless did more than respond to an emergency. It introduced a binding allocation mechanism in an area directly linked to national political responsibility. It connected three elements that would later become central to EU migration law: migratory pressure, solidarity and enforceable responsibility-sharing. In that context, Article 80 TFEU also gained enhanced legal importance. Although not an autonomous legal basis, solidarity increasingly became a concrete legal argument capable of supporting binding obligations.

Hungary and Slovakia challenged the relocation decision before the Court of Justice. In Joined Cases C-643/15 and C-647/15, the Court dismissed the actions and upheld the legality of Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601.[3] It accepted the use of Article 78(3) TFEU and confirmed that the contested decision could be adopted as a provisional measure in response to an emergency situation. From the perspective of competence allocation, the judgment had a broader effect: it validated a strong reading of the Union’s emergency competence in asylum and confirmed that a crisis measure could impose concrete obligations on Member States, even where politically contested.

A further step followed in Joined Cases C-715/17, C-718/17 and C-719/17, where the Commission brought infringement proceedings against Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic for refusing to comply with the temporary relocation mechanism. The Court held that those Member States had failed to fulfil their obligations under EU law.[4] This judgment is significant because the Member States invoked public order and internal security concerns. The Court did not accept Article 72 TFEU as a general justification for refusing to apply binding EU measures and required concrete and sufficiently substantiated reasons. Once the European Union had adopted a binding migration measure, Member State resistance was no longer treated primarily as a disagreement over the limits of EU authority. It became a question of compliance. The issue shifted from ‘may the European Union impose this obligation?’ to ‘have the Member State fulfilled it?’. This is one of the defining features of competence creep.

The 2015 relocation mechanism was not a practical success. Its original relocation target was not reached, and the number of persons relocated remained far below the political objective. Yet constitutional precedents are not measured only by practical performance. A mechanism may fail administratively and still succeed institutionally. The relocation scheme created a vocabulary, a legal structure and a litigation model that continued to influence EU migration policy after the immediate crisis had passed. Its vocabulary was solidarity. Its legal structure was binding responsibility-sharing. Its litigation model was the conversion of refusal into infringement. Together, these elements created a template for later reforms.

This is precisely how competence creep operates. A measure is first justified by exceptional pressure. The Court confirms its legality and enforceability. The legal reasoning then becomes available for future institutional use. Over time, an exceptional measure becomes a model for ordinary governance. The difficulty lies in the transformation of solidarity from a principle guiding cooperation into an instrument capable of creating binding allocation or contribution duties. Solidarity may mean assistance to frontline Member States, financial support, operational cooperation, border assistance and capacity-building. But when solidarity becomes a legal mechanism through which Member States are required to accept relocation duties or equivalent obligations, the constitutional question changes. Who defines solidarity? Who quantifies it? Who administers it? And how much discretion remains for Member States that do not accept the underlying policy choice?

The relocation litigation also illustrates the role of the Court of Justice in consolidating competence expansion. The Court must ensure the uniform interpretation and effectiveness of EU law, yet its case law may narrow national space in politically sensitive fields. Once EU rules become detailed and enforceable, national deviation is increasingly framed as illegality rather than policy disagreement. If meaningful choices are increasingly made through EU-level instruments while implementation costs and domestic political responsibility remain national, the democratic link is weakened. Member States continue to carry political responsibility, but their practical discretion narrows. The most serious problem is not open centralisation, which would require political debate and, in some cases, Treaty amendment. The more difficult problem is gradual centralisation without an explicit constitutional moment: the formal Treaty text remains unchanged, but the practical balance of authority shifts.

The 2015 relocation precedent therefore remains central to any serious discussion of EU migration competence. It was not merely an emergency response. It showed that the European Union could rely on emergency, solidarity and judicial enforcement to impose obligations in a field where Member State responsibility remains constitutionally significant. It also showed how temporary crisis management may create permanent legal expectations. The lesson is not that the European Union must be passive in the face of migratory pressure. A common asylum system and the Schengen area necessarily require cooperation. The lesson is rather that cooperation must remain anchored in Treaty limits. Emergency cannot become a substitute for competence. Solidarity cannot become a general clause of centralisation. Legal categories cannot be dissolved into broad political language. Migration is therefore a test of constitutional discipline. If the European Union respects the limits of conferral, subsidiarity and proportionality, common action may strengthen both effectiveness and legitimacy. If it expands its practical authority through emergency logic, broad terminology and judicial consolidation, it risks producing a more centralised system with a weaker constitutional foundation.[5]


[1] Article 5(3)–(4) TEU; Protocol No 2 on subsidiarity and proportionality, OJ C 115, 9.5.2008, pp. 206–209

[2] Council Decision (EU) 2015/1601 of 22 September 2015 establishing provisional measures in the area of international protection for the benefit of Italy and Greece OJ L 248, 24.9.2015, pp. 80–94.

[3] CJEU, Judgment of 6 September 2017, Joined Cases C-643/15 and C-647/15, Slovak Republic and Hungary v Council, ECLI:EU:C:2017:631.

[4] CJEU, Judgment of 2 April 2020, Joined Cases C-715/17, C-718/17 and C-719/17, Commission v Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic, ECLI:EU:C:2020:257.

[5] Cf. Garben, S. (2020) ‘From sneaking to striding: Combatting competence creep and consolidating the EU legislative process’, European Law Journal, 26(5–6), pp. 429–447.


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