Rule of Law Standards in the EU: A Comparative Look at Pre- and Post-Accession Frameworks

Marie Beyrich & Alexander Graser
2 hours ago
18 min read

I. Introduction

The European Union’s mechanisms for safeguarding the rule of law within Member States have evolved significantly over the years, reflecting the EU’s identity as a union built on shared legal principles and values. From the onset, the EU’s commitment to the rule of law was woven into the accession criteria for new Member States, establishing fundamental expectations that guide the Union’s structure and governance. However, a crucial difference emerges when comparing the mechanisms available pre- and post-accession, revealing a disparity in the EU’s capacity to enforce rule of law standards effectively once countries have gained membership status.^[1]

The subsequent sections outline the mechanisms the EU employs both before and after accession to uphold the rule of law and ensure compliance among Member States. While the pre-accession instruments demonstrate considerable strength, providing the EU with substantial leverage to rigorously enforce rule of law standards on candidate countries, the post-accession mechanisms are constrained by technical and procedural limitations. These constraints leave the EU with hardly effective tools to address systemic breaches once they arise within Member States. This disparity in enforcement capacity highlights critical questions regarding the EU’s structural resilience and its long-term ability to safeguard its foundational values.

II. Understanding the Rule of Law in the EU Context

The rule of law, while a universally resonant principle, takes on distinct significance within the EU’s legal framework. Across Member States, the rule of law concept is expressed in various languages, from "Rechtsstaat" in German to "État de Droit" in French, each carrying nuanced interpretations rooted in national legal traditions. Within the EU, the rule of law serves as a foundational pillar, encapsulated within treaties and highlighted in the Copenhagen Criteria^[2] as a prerequisite for accession. Specifically, the Maastricht Treaty of 1993 marked the EU’s first explicit treaty-level commitment to the rule of law, affirming the Union’s dedication to “liberty, democracy, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the rule of law.”^[3]

This foundational commitment was further entrenched in the Amsterdam Treaty of 1997, which recognized the rule of law as a common principle shared among Member States.^[4] This laid the groundwork for Article 2 TEU, which emphasizes the rule of law as a core EU value.^[5] Despite its centrality, the rule of law has been defined only broadly in EU treaties, relying on national implementation and lacking a precise operational definition that addresses the varying legal traditions within the EU. Consequently, in the Member States, there are different understandings of the rule of law. While some focus on formal procedural elements such as legal certainty and the enforcement of laws, others emphasize substantive components like the protection of fundamental rights.^[6]

In recent years, efforts to refine the EU’s understanding of the rule of law have advanced. For instance, Regulation 2020/2092, or the Conditionality Regulation, provides a more detailed definition, underscoring principles such as legality, transparency, judicial independence, and non-discrimination.^[7] Furthermore, the European Court of Justice has underscored aspects like the protection of legitimate expectations and legal certainty, giving substance to the rule of law within the EU’s jurisdiction.^[8]

III. Mechanisms to Secure Rule of Law Before EU Accession

The EU wields considerable leverage during the pre-accession phase, enabling it to align candidate countries’ legal systems with EU standards, particularly concerning the rule of law.^[9] This process is structured and prolonged, offering multiple points at which the EU can evaluate and influence a candidate's adherence to its principles.

The procedural mechanisms within the accession framework offer several stages of review and assessment, beginning with an extensive period of dialogue and preparation. Even before a formal application is submitted, candidate countries engage in discussions with EU institutions, addressing specific requirements that must be met.^[10] Once an application is submitted under Article 49 TEU, the process becomes highly structured, with the Council playing a pivotal role in determining whether formal negotiations should commence. This decision lies entirely at the Council’s discretion, ensuring that only countries demonstrating genuine commitment to EU values are allowed to proceed.^[11]

Accession negotiations themselves are an intricate, multi-year process involving repeated evaluations of the candidate’s alignment with EU values, especially concerning rule of law standards.^[12]^[13] The EU retains the authority to suspend or terminate negotiations if a candidate country deviates from these standards, underscoring the Union’s leverage over potential Member States.^[14]

Beyond procedural safeguards, the EU imposes substantive requirements, demanding that candidates actively commit to Article 2 TEU values. This expectation extends beyond formal legal alignment, requiring tangible actions within state institutions to reflect EU principles in practice. Notably, the Copenhagen Criteria play a central role, influencing candidate countries even before an official application, thus embedding the rule of law as a guiding standard throughout the pre-accession process.^[15]^[16]

IV. Mechanisms for Protecting the Rule of Law After Accession

Upon achieving EU membership, the mechanisms to enforce rule of law standards shift significantly.^[17] While preventive mechanisms such as reporting tools and dialogue-based formats exist, their efficacy in ensuring compliance remains limited. The EU’s annual Rule of Law Report, for instance, provides a comprehensive review of each Member State’s adherence to rule of law principles.^[18] However, it lacks enforcement power, serving more as a documentation tool than a corrective measure.^[19]

Other tools, such as the EU Justice Scoreboard^[20] and the European Semester^[21], offer data-driven insights into national justice systems, emphasizing efficiency, independence, and quality. Despite their value as monitoring tools, these mechanisms face criticism for their reliance on quantitative data, which may overlook qualitative aspects essential to judicial independence and rule of law.^[22] Dialogue-based tools,^[23] meanwhile, encourage political pressure among Member States but lack the authority to compel compliance, diminishing their overall effectiveness.^[24]

Corrective mechanisms, like the Infringement Procedure and Article 7 TEU, are intended to address breaches of EU law. However, they encounter significant hurdles in practice. Infringement procedures, though capable of imposing financial penalties,^[25] are slow and limited in scope, targeting isolated incidents rather than addressing systemic issues.^[26]^[27]Additionally, Article 7 TEU, often referred to as the “nuclear option,”^[28] requires unanimity among all other member states to suspend voting rights, a procedural hurdle that has proven insurmountable in recent cases involving Poland and Hungary.^[29] The reluctance of Member States to use this drastic measure reflects a broader hesitation within the EU to exclude fellow members, underscoring the political challenges inherent in enforcing rule of law standards post-accession.^[30]

The Conditionality Regulation, introduced in 2020,^[31] represents a novel approach by tying rule of law compliance to EU budgetary protection. While it allows for financial sanctions against Member States that compromise the EU’s financial interests, its application has been criticized for its narrow scope and susceptibility to political influence. Critics argue that this regulation effectively monetizes rule of law compliance, prioritizing budgetary concerns over broader principles. Additionally, the requirement for a qualified majority in the Council to impose measures has diluted its impact, further limiting its effectiveness as a rule of law safeguard.^[32]

V. Conclusion

In summary, the EU’s framework for ensuring rule of law compliance is notably robust during the pre-accession phase, offering substantial leverage to align candidate countries with EU values. However, post-accession, the tools available are weaker, restricted by procedural and political limitations. This gap in enforcement capability underscores a structural vulnerability within the EU, raising questions about the long-term resilience of its value-based union.

It has become clear that the effectiveness of the tools largely depends on political power dynamics – and their reversal before and after accession – due to the lack of a clearly defined legal framework. Had there been a clear legal framework in place, such political reliance would not be as necessary. Given the lack of clarity in the material law, one possible solution could be to address the issue procedurally and institutionally rather than materially, namely by entrusting the courts with the authority to resolve such matters. However, such an approach would hardly be realistic in the context of such a politically sensitive matter.

Given the challenges, much of the discussion surrounding reforms focuses on proposals such as amending Article 7 TEU to ease activation requirements or expanding the scope of the Conditionality Regulation, both of which aim to address these weaknesses. Yet, the effectiveness of these measures remains uncertain, as enforcing shared values in a diverse political union like the EU entails both legal and diplomatic challenges. Ultimately, the EU’s reliance on voluntary adherence to its foundational principles reveals an inherent limitation: a Member State that no longer feels substantively bound to these values may not be deterred by legal sanctions alone. As such, the EU’s strength as a union of shared values rests not solely on its legal mechanisms but also on the enduring commitment of its members to uphold these principles.

^[1] This discrepancy is often referred to as the "Copenhagen dilemma". Former EU Commissioner Viviane Reding articulated this dilemma, emphasizing that while stringent standards exist pre-accession, the EU’s ability to enforce these values diminishes once a country joins, as it lacks the decisive instruments to prevent backsliding within Member State, see Reding, 2013, Speech: Safeguarding the rule of law and solving the "Copenhagen dilemma": Towards a new EU-mechanism.

^[2] See European Council, 1993, Presidency Conclusions from the Copenhagen European Council on 21-22 June 1993.

^[3] Preamble of the Maastricht Treaty, Official Journal C 191, 29/07/1992 P. 0001 – 0110, recital 3, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:11992M/TXT.

^[4] See Treaty of Amsterdam amending the Treaty on European Union, the Treaties establishing the European Communities and certain related acts, Official Journal C 340, 10/11/1997 P. 0001 – 0144, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:11997D/TXT.

^[5] See Article 2 TEU: “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law, and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity, and equality between women and men prevail.”

^[6] See Classen, 2008, Rechtsstaatlichkeit als Primärrechtsgebot in der Europäischen Union – Vertragsrechtliche Grundlagen und Rechtsprechung der Gemeinschaftsgerichte, pp. 7 ff.; Hilf, M., Schorkopf, F., 2024, in: Grabitz, E., Hilf, M., Nettesheim, M., 2024, Das Recht der Europäischen Union, Article 2 TEU para. 35; Calliess, C., 2022, in: Calliess, C., Ruffert, M., 2022, EUV/AEUV, Article 2 TEU para. 27.

^[7] See Article 2 (a) of the regulation 2020/2092 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget of December 16, 2020, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/reg/2020/2092/oj, defines the rule of law as encompassing “the principles of legality implying a transparent, accountable, democratic and pluralistic legislative process; legal certainty; prohibition of arbitrariness of the executive powers; effective judicial protection by independent and impartial courts, including with regard to fundamental rights; separation of powers; and non-discrimination and equality before the law.”

^[8] See the overview in Classen, 2008, Rechtsstaatlichkeit als Primärrechtsgebot in der Europäischen Union – Vertragsrechtliche Grundlagen und Rechtsprechung der Gemeinschaftsgerichte, pp. 11 ff. and see for example ECJ, Judgment of April 17, 1997, C-90/95, paras. 35 ff.; ECJ, Judgment of January 25, 1979, C-98/78, para. 20; ECJ, Judgment of July 9, 1981, C-169/80, para. 17; ECJ, Judgment of October 15, 1987, C-222/86, para. 15; ECJ, Judgment of July 25, 2018, C‑216/18 PPU, para. 48; ECJ, Judgment of February 27, 2018, C-64/16, para. 36.

^[9] The effectiveness of the available tools ultimately depends on consistent application and political will though, as the process remains inherently political.

^[10] During this preparatory phase, key decisions are made to establish specific criteria that the candidate must meet, and an initial assessment of the candidate’s alignment with EU values, especially the rule of law, is conducted. This structured approach is designed to guide candidates in making the necessary institutional and legal reforms to fulfill the requirements for membership even before a formal application is submitted, see Knauff, M., 2010, Die Erweiterung der Europäischen Union auf Grundlage des Vertrags von Lissabon, p. 636; European Commission, 2009, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council - Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2009-2010 under Nr. 3.

^[11] See Ohler, C., 2024, in: Grabitz, E., Hilf, M., Nettesheim, M., 2024, Das Recht der Europäischen Union, Article 49 TEU para. 8.

^[12] The negotiations are structured into clusters and chapters, currently totaling 35 chapters, see European Commission, 2023, The EU accession process; European Commission, no date, Chapters of the acquis. In its reports on the political situation in candidate countries, the Commission examines issues related to “rule of law” with a view to accession readiness, including the separation of powers, parliamentary immunity, judicial protection through an independent judiciary, and effective anti-corruption measures, see Hilf, M., Schorkopf, F., 2024, in: Grabitz, E., Hilf, M., Nettesheim, M., 2024, Das Recht der Europäischen Union, Article 2 TEU para. 35; Calliess, C., 2022, in: Calliess, C., Ruffert, M., 2022, EUV/AEUV, Article 2 TEU para. 27. At each stage, the EU reviews the candidate’s advancements and verifies alignment with Article 2 TEU values, ensuring that the country continues to implement necessary changes, Knauff, M., 2010, Die Erweiterung der Europäischen Union auf Grundlage des Vertrags von Lissabon, p. 636; European Parliament, 2024, The Enlargement of the Union; European Union, no date, EU enlargement; European Commission, 2023, The EU accession process; European Commission, no date, Chapters of the acquis; Ohler, C., 2024, in: Grabitz, E., Hilf, M., Nettesheim, M., 2024, Das Recht der Europäischen Union, Article 49 TEU paras. 23 ff.; Cremer, H., 2022, in: Calliess, C., Ruffert, M., 2022, EUV/AEUV, Article 49 TEU paras. 2 ff.; Terhechte, J., 2023, in: Pechstein, M., Nowak, C., Häde, U., 2023, Frankfurter Kommentar EUV/GRC/AEUV, Art. 49 TEU paras. 21 ff.

^[13] See, for example, the lengthy accession negotiations with the Western Balkan countries. For Montenegro: European Union, 2024, The EU and Montenegro; for Serbia: European Union, 2024, The EU and Serbia; Additionally, progress reports from the European Commission provide further insights, see European Commission, no date, Strategy and Reports - Previous documents.

^[14] See, for example, the accession negotiations with Turkey, which have come to a standstill, partly due to rule of law concerns. The Council notes that "Turkey has been moving further away from the European Union. Turkey's accession negotiations have therefore effectively come to a standstill, and no further chapters can be considered for opening or closing, and no further work towards the modernization of the EU-Turkey Customs Union is foreseen.", Council, 2018, Conclusions in Enlargement and Stabilisation and Association Process of June 26 under Nr. 35. See Ohler, C., 2024, in: Grabitz, E., Hilf, M., Nettesheim, M., 2024, Das Recht der Europäischen Union, Article 49 TEU para. 33 and 38; Nettesheim, M., 2003, EU-Beitritt und Unrechtsaufarbeitung, p. 59.

^[15] See Ohler, C., 2024, in: Grabitz, E., Hilf, M., Nettesheim, M., 2024, Das Recht der Europäischen Union, Article 49 TEU paras. 15 ff.; Knauff, M., 2010, Die Erweiterung der Europäischen Union auf Grundlage des Vertrags von Lissabon, pp. 633 f.; Cremer, H., 2022, in: Calliess, C., Ruffert, M., 2022, EUV/AEUV, Article 49 TEU paras. 8 ff.; Nettesheim, M., 2003, EU-Beitritt und Unrechtsaufarbeitung, pp. 39 ff.; Terhechte, J., 2023, in: Pechstein, M., Nowak, C., Häde, U., 2023, Frankfurter Kommentar EUV/GRC/AEUV, Art. 49 TEU paras. 18 f.

^[16] The ultimate effectiveness of this framework depends on consistent application and political will, as the process remains inherently political. This means that the extent to which the EU insists on compliance with the criteria under Article 49 TEU is subject to its discretion, Ohler, C., 2024, in: Grabitz, E., Hilf, M., Nettesheim, M., 2024, Das Recht der Europäischen Union, Article 49 TEU para. 31; Nettesheim, M., 2003, EU-Beitritt und Unrechtsaufarbeitung, p. 60.

^[17] The weakness of post-accession tools is already apparent in the ongoing backsliding on rule of law standards across the Union, as highlighted in the European Commission’s latest Rule of Law Report. In several Member States, there are persistent, systemic concerns, and the situation has continued to deteriorate, see European Commission, 2024, 2024 Rule of Law Report.

^[18] The Rule of Law Report is designed to stimulate discussion among Member States, the European Commission, the European Council, and the European Parliament. It provides an annual assessment of rule of law conditions across the EU, drawing on input from national authorities, independent institutions, and civil society organizations. The report summarizes positive and negative developments, covering key areas like the judiciary, anti-corruption efforts, and checks and balances. Since 2022, it also includes country-specific recommendations, see European Commission, no date, Annual Rule of Law Cycle; European Commission, 2024, 2024 Rule of law report – methodology; Skóra, M., How to Improve the EU’s Rule of Law Toolbox, p. 2.

^[19] See LibertiesEU, 2022, The EU Commission's 3rd Rule of Law Report: Progress, But More Action Needed.

^[20] The EU Justice Scoreboard presents annual comparative data on the efficiency, quality, and independence of national justice systems, offering a factual basis for Member States to improve their judicial performance. Its findings contribute to other EU initiatives, such as the European Semester and the Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation, providing empirical support for corrective actions, see European Commission, no date, EU Justice Scoreboard.

^[21] The European Semester is a yearly process resulting in country-specific recommendations on macroeconomic and structural issues, including on justice systems and anticorruption, aiming to boost economic growth, see European Commission, no date, The European Semester.

^[22] See Jakab, A., Kirchmair, L., 2020, How to Quantify a Proportionate Financial Punishment in the New EU Rule of Law Mechanism?.

^[23] The dialogue-based formats include the exchange between the Commission and individual Member States under the Rule of Law Framework established in 2014, allowing the Commission to assess and issue recommendations for states exhibiting democratic backsliding, see European Commission, 2014, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, A new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law. This exchange precedes the use of Art. 7 TEU. Additionally, there are dialogues among the Member States themselves, which include both country-specific discussions on rule of law issues and broader discussions on the overall state of the rule of law across the EU, see Council, 2023, Presidency conclusions, Evaluation of the annual rule of law dialogue; Council, 2020, Annual Rule of Law Dialogue. The Rule of Law Peer Review was established in 2020 enhancing the annual Council Rule of Law Dialogues that were first established in 2014, see Skóra, M., 2023, How to Improve the EU’s Rule of Law Toolbox, p. 3.

^[24] See Conzelmann, T., 2022, Peer Reviewing the Rule of Law? A New Mechanism to Safeguard EU Values, pp. 685 ff.

^[25] See Article 258 and 260 TFEU; European Commission, no date, Infringement Procedure.

^[26] According to Karpenstein, U., 2024, in: Grabitz, E., Hilf, M., Nettesheim, M., 2024, Das Recht der Europäischen Union, Art. 258 TFEU para. 13: Even with efforts to expedite the process, it rarely takes less than three years from the decision to initiate proceedings to the ECJ’s ruling on a treaty violation, even in cases of seemingly clear breaches. See also Skóra, M., 2023, How to Improve the EU’s Rule of Law Toolbox, p. 5; Bárd, P., Śledzińska-Simon, A., 2019, The puissance of infringement procedures in tackling rule of law backsliding. Moreover, the procedure requires linking breaches to specific legal norms, making it difficult to address rule of law violations that don’t neatly violate particular articles beyond Article 2 TEU. This remains the current state, though recent ECJ case law (ASJP, LM, and Repubblika) indicates a development toward the justiciability of Article 2 TEU, see ECJ, Judgment if February 27, 2018, C‑64/16; ECJ, Judgment of July 25, 2018, C-216/18 PPU; ECJ, Judgment of April 20, 2021, C-896/19. The Commission has now initiated an infringement procedure based on Article 2 TEU as a standalone provision (see European Commission v Hungary, Action brought on 19 December 2022, C-769/22), though the ECJ has not yet ruled on it. For an overview, see Kaiser, L., 2023, A New Chapter in the European Rule of Law Saga?. Additionally, while the ECJ can confirm a treaty violation, this process does not lead to the loss of voting rights or other direct consequences, and further action is needed to ensure compliance, highlighting its reactive rather than preventive nature, see Articles 258 and 260 TFEU, which limit the consequences of an infringement procedure to imposing a lump sum or penalty payment – and only when the EU country is referred to the Court for a second time, see European Commission, no date, Infringement Procedure.

^[27] In serious cases, as seen in Poland, repeated communications and reasoned opinions from the Commission have had limited impact, see Grzeszczak, R., Karolewski, I., 2017, Mind the Gap! Schwierigkeiten der Rechtsstaatlichkeit in der EU; Skóra, M., 2023, How to Improve the EU’s Rule of Law Toolbox, p. 5.

^[28] The term was established by José Manuel Durão Barroso, see European Commission, 2013, State of the Union address 2013. See considerations regarding why it may not necessarily be a 'nuclear option' in Scheppele, K., Pech, L., 2018, Is Article 7 Really the EU’s “Nuclear Option”?.

^[29] The European Commission invoked the procedure against Poland in 2017, followed by the European Parliament’s activation of the same process for Hungary in 2018. Despite these actions, no conclusive sanctions were imposed, see European Parliament, 2024, The Hungarian government threatens EU values, institutions, and funds, MEPs say; European Commission, 2024, Commission intends to close Article 7(1) TEU procedure for Poland; Skóra, M., 2023, How to Improve the EU’s Rule of Law Toolbox.

^[30] The procedural and legal hurdles, including high voting thresholds – a 4/5 majority in the Council to determine a risk, unanimity in the European Council to confirm a breach, and a qualified majority in the Council for sanctions – render it highly susceptible to the political dynamics within the EU. Member States are often reluctant to support such drastic measures, wary of potential repercussions for future votes or of creating precedents that may one day apply to themselves. This reluctance effectively weakens Article 7’s capacity to serve as a genuine deterrent. Additionally, Article 7’s nature as a political mechanism, with each step left to the discretion of EU institutions, means that it has more symbolic than practical impact. The process itself is cumbersome and slow, typically following an extended period of observation and dialogue. Furthermore, as sanctions under Article 7 are unlikely to strengthen weak rule-of-law institutions directly, the provision’s effectiveness in addressing systemic rule-of-law backsliding remains limited. See also Maria Skóra, M., 2023, How to Improve the EU’s Rule of Law Toolbox, p. 5.

^[31] See Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:32020R2092.

^[32] See Dimitrovs, A., Droste, H., 2020, Conditionality Mechanism: What’s In It?; Skóra, M., 2023, How to Improve the EU’s Rule of Law Toolbox, p. 5; Baraggia, A., Bonelli, M., 2022, Linking Money to Values: The New Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation and Its Constitutional Challenges, pp. 146 ff. This financial focus (and therefore limited impact) is also evident in the fact that the regulation has so far only been applied against Hungary and not against Poland, as the rule of law breaches in Poland have not been directly linked to the sound financial management of the EU budget, see European Commission, 2024, Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget, p. 3.

References

Baraggia, A., Bonelli, M. (2022) Linking Money to Values: The New Rule of Law Conditionality Regulation and Its Constitutional Challenges, German Law Journal, 2022/23 Issue 2, pp. 131–156 [Online]. Available at: https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/german-law-journal/article/linking-money-to-values-the-new-rule-of-law-conditionality-regulation-and-its-constitutional-challenges/F649CD318CB03DFC14A77979CDA72B75 (Accessed: 16 November 2024).

Bárd, P., Śledzińska-Simon, A. (2019) The puissance of infringement procedures in tackling rule of law backsliding[Online]. Available at: https://verfassungsblog.de/the-puissance-of-infringement-procedures-in-tackling-rule-of-law-backsliding/ (Accessed: 16 November 2024).

Calliess, C., Ruffert, M. (2022) EUV/AEUV, Das Verfassungsrecht der Europäischen Union mit Europäischer Grundrechtecharta, 6th Edition.

Classen, C. (2008) Rechtsstaatlichkeit als Primärrechtsgebot in der Europäischen Union – Vertragsrechtliche Grundlagen und Rechtsprechung der Gemeinschaftsgerichte, Europarecht, 2008/Beiheft 3, pp. 7-23.

Conzelmann, T. (2022) Peer Reviewing the Rule of Law? A New Mechanism to Safeguard EU Values, European Papers,2022/7 No. 2, pp. 671-695 [Online]. Available at: https://www.europeanpapers.eu/en/system/files/pdf_version/EP_eJ_2022_2_SS2_3_Thomas_Conzelman_00593.pdf (Accessed: 16 November 2024).

Council (2023) Presidency conclusions, Evaluation of the annual rule of law dialogue, 16547/23 [Online]. Available at: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-16547-2023-INIT/en/pdf (Accessed: 16 November 2024).

Council (2020) Annual Rule of Law Dialogue, 11094/20 [Online]. Available at: https://data.consilium.europa.eu/doc/document/ST-11094-2020-INIT/en/pdf (Accessed: 16 November 2024).

Council (2018) Conclusions in Enlargement and Stabilisation and Association Process of June 26, 1018, 10555/18 [Online]. Available at: https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/35863/st10555-en18.pdf (Accessed: 16 November 2024).

Dimitrovs, A., Droste, H. (2020) Conditionality Mechanism: What’s In It? [Online]. Available at: https://verfassungsblog.de/conditionality-mechanism-whats-in-it/ (Accessed: 16 November 2024).

European Commission (2024) 2024 Rule of Law Report [Online]. Available at: https://commission.europa.eu/publications/2024-rule-law-report-communication-and-country-chapters_de (Accessed: 16 November 2024).

European Commission (2024) 2024 Rule of law report – methodology [Online]. Available at: https://commission.europa.eu/document/e80a08e9-a5cd-4100-833d-f87548004226_en (Accessed: 16 November 2024).

European Commission (2024) Commission intends to close Article 7(1) TEU procedure for Poland [Online]. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/ip_24_2461 (Accessed: 16 November 2024).

European Commission (2024) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council on the application of Regulation (EU, Euratom) 2020/2092 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 16 December 2020 on a general regime of conditionality for the protection of the Union budget, COM(2024) 17 final/2 [Online]. Available at: https://commission.europa.eu/document/download/9572e5aa-7ff5-461c-8881-fca20ce757ba_en?filename=COM_2024_17_F2_COMMUNICATION_FROM_COMMISSION_TO_INST_EN_V4_P1_3224729_0.PDF (Accessed: 16 November 2024).

European Commission (2023) The EU accession process [Online]. Available at: https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/a9099136-b301-458e-a846-c6bf8c47d287_en?filename=Factsheet-EU-accession-process-cluster-newlayout-EP2023_0.pdf (Accessed: 16 November 2024).

European Commission (2014) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council, A new EU Framework to strengthen the Rule of Law, COM/2014/0158 final [Online]. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52014DC0158 (Accessed: 16 November 2024).

European Commission (2013) State of the Union address 2013 [Online]. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_13_684 (Accessed: 16 November 2024).

European Commission (2009) Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament and the Council - Enlargement Strategy and Main Challenges 2009-2010, COM(2009) 533 final of October 14, 2009 [Online]. Available at: https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/HTML/?uri=CELEX:52009DC0533 (Accessed: 16 November 2024).

European Commission (no date) Annual Rule of Law Cycle [Online]. Available at: https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/rule-law/annual-rule-law-cycle_en (Accessed: 16 November 2024).

European Commission (no date) Chapters of the acquis [Online]. Available at: https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/conditions-membership/chapters-acquis_en (Accessed: 16 November 2024).

European Commission (no date) EU Justice Scoreboard [Online]. Available at: https://commission.europa.eu/strategy-and-policy/policies/justice-and-fundamental-rights/upholding-rule-law/eu-justice-scoreboard_en (Accessed: 16 November 2024).

European Commission (no date) Infringement Procedure [Online]. Available at: https://commission.europa.eu/law/application-eu-law/implementing-eu-law/infringement-procedure_en (Accessed: 16 November 2024).

European Commission (no date) Strategy and Reports - Previous documents [Online]. Available at: https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/strategy-and-reports/strategy-and-reports-previous-documents_en (Accessed: 16 November 2024).

European Commission (no date) The European Semester [Online]. Available at: https://commission.europa.eu/business-economy-euro/european-semester_en#:~:text=The%20European%20Semester%20framework,-The%20European%20Semester&text=As%20a%20response%2C%20EU%20Member,reformed%20Stability%20and%20Growth%20Pact (Accessed: 16 November 2024).

European Council (1993) Presidency Conclusions from the Copenhagen European Council on 21-22 June 1993 [Online]. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/enlargement/ec/pdf/cop_en.pdf (Accessed: 16 November 2024).

European Parliament (2024) The Enlargement of the Union [Online]. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/factsheets/en/sheet/167/die-erweiterung-der-europaischen-union (Accessed: 16 November 2024).

European Parliament (2024) The Hungarian government threatens EU values, institutions, and funds, MEPs say [Online]. Available at: https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/nl/press-room/20240112IPR16780/the-hungarian-government-threatens-eu-values-institutions-and-funds-meps-say (Accessed: 16 November 2024).

European Union (2024) The EU and Montenegro [Online]. Available at: https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/3e88d41e-df46-44ae-9986-bfb12793a6b8_en?filename=EU-Montenegro-factsheet-2024.pdf (Accessed: 16 November 2024).

European Union (2024) The EU and Serbia [Online]. Available at: https://neighbourhood-enlargement.ec.europa.eu/document/download/81490f3f-06fb-428e-9a9c-be1deeb6f36b_en?filename=EU-Serbia-factsheet-2024.pdf (Accessed: 16 November 2024).

European Union (no date) EU enlargement [Online]. Available at: https://european-union.europa.eu/principles-countries-history/eu-enlargement_en (Accessed: 16 November 2024).

Grabitz, E., Hilf, M., Nettesheim, M. (2024), Das Recht der Europäischen Union.

Grzeszczak, R., Karolewski, I. (2017) Mind the Gap! Schwierigkeiten der Rechtsstaatlichkeit in der EU [Online]. Available at: https://verfassungsblog.de/mind-the-gap-schwierigkeiten-der-rechtsstaatlichkeit-in-der-eu (Accessed: 16 November 2024).

Jakab, A., Kirchmair, L. (2020) How to Quantify a Proportionate Financial Punishment in the New EU Rule of Law Mechanism? [Online]. Available at: https://verfassungsblog.de/how-to-quantify-a-proportionate-financial-punishment-in-the-new-eu-rule-of-law-mechanism/ (Accessed: 16 November 2024).

Kaiser, L. (2023) A New Chapter in the European Rule of Law Saga? [Online]. Available at: https://verfassungsblog.de/a-new-chapter-in-the-european-rule-of-law-saga/ (Accessed: 16 November 2024).

Knauff, M. (2010) Die Erweiterung der Europäischen Union auf Grundlage des Vertrags von Lissabon, Die Öffentliche Verwaltung, 2010/15, pp. 631-638.

LibertiesEU (2022) The EU Commission's 3rd Rule of Law Report: Progress, But More Action Needed [Online]. Available at: https://www.liberties.eu/en/stories/eu-commission-third-rule-of-law-report-progress-but-more-action-needed/44372 (Accessed: 16 November 2024).

Nettesheim, M. (2003) EU-Beitritt und Unrechtsaufarbeitung, Europarecht, 2003/1, pp. 36-64.

Pechstein, M., Nowak, C., Häde, U. (2023) Frankfurter Kommentar EUV/GRC/AEUV, 2nd Edition.

Reding, V. (2013) Speech: Safeguarding the rule of law and solving the "Copenhagen dilemma": Towards a new EU-mechanism [Online]. Available at: https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_13_348 (Accessed: 16 November 2024).

Scheppele, K., Pech, L. (2018) Is Article 7 Really the EU’s “Nuclear Option”? [Online]. Available at: https://verfassungsblog.de/is-article-7-really-the-eus-nuclear-option/ (Accessed: 16 November 2024).

Skóra, M. (2023) How to Improve the EU’s Rule of Law Toolbox [Online]. Available at: https://library.fes.de/pdf-files/bueros/bruessel/20380.pdf (Accessed: 16 November 2024).