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'Starving' the Constitutional Tribunal


The Constitutional Tribunal (CT) is a central, constitutional body of the Republic of Poland. Although it is not an organ of the justice system, the CT is part of the judicial power[1] and does not administer justice, thereby not interfering in the sphere of competence

of the courts.[2]

Moreover, the CT is fundamentally distinguished from the courts by the main function entrusted to it by the legislator: to control the hierarchical conformity of legal norms with the Constitution. Therefore, the fundamental task of the Tribunal is to determine the consistency of lower-level legal norms with higher-level norms, particularly the Constitution.[3] Furthermore, the CT resolves competence disputes between the state's central constitutional organs.[4]

The CT consists of fifteen judges, who are elected individually by the Sejm for a period of nine years from among individuals distinguished by their legal expertise. Re-election to the Tribunal is inadmissible.[5] The Tribunal is therefore a body composed of judges, emphasising its affiliation to the judicial authorities and its distinctiveness and independence from other authorities. This way, the legislator has guaranteed the constitutional status of CT judges, in particular their irremovability from judicial office, in the context of the general guarantees to which judges of courts administering justice are entitled. In the exercise of their office, CT judges are independent and subject only to the Constitution.[6]

In accordance with the principle of the separation and balance of legislative, executive and judicial powers,[7] each of the three branches should be endowed with competences that materially correspond to its nature. Each branch should also possess a minimum of exclusive competences to ensure the preservation of its essence.

According to the Constitution, CT judges are entitled to working conditions and remuneration that reflect the dignity of their office and the scope of their duties.[8] In constitutional law doctrine, the issue of judges' remuneration is considered to have an impact on their independence, freeing them from material pressures from the legislature or executive, and safeguarding them against corruption. This provision therefore guarantees judges' remuneration at a constitutional level, thereby limiting the extent to which the legislature can interfere with the system that determines it.[9]

Therefore, the principle of checks and balances is violated if the legislative authority exerts influence over the CT in a way that limits that body's independence by withholding public funds that would enable it to pay remuneration and other benefits to all its judges.

To protect the distinctiveness of these bodies, particularly the independence of courts and tribunals, it is necessary to ensure that they have at least some influence over the management of state finances. This will guarantee citizens an organisation of the judiciary that actually makes their right to a court a reality, rather than just seeming to do so.[10]

The ruling coalition in Poland, which includes the Civic Coalition, the Left, the Polish People's Party and Poland 2050, has been in power since 13 December 2023. For Poles, this is a symbolic date as it marks the introduction of martial law by the communist military junta in 1981. The coalition continues its efforts to undermine the status of the CT. Despite lacking any legal basis, these actions are described as part of the campaign to ‘restore the rule of law.’

Members of the ruling coalition articulated their apparent strategy of ‘starving’ the CT, as well as the National Council of the Judiciary, the Supreme Court and the Institute of National Remembrance.

 In October 2024, the Parliamentary Committee on Justice and Human Rights — dominated by representatives of the ruling majority — issued a negative opinion to the Public Finance Committee regarding the draft budget law for 2025. Specifically, the Committee opposed the proposed funding levels for key judicial and constitutional institutions, including the CT.[11]

Maciej Berek, head of the Council of Ministers’ Standing Committee, justified these cuts by stating that funding institutions whose legitimacy has been questioned by international tribunals is unwarranted. He also emphasised that the government recommends “adjusting” the budgets of the CT and the National Council of the Judiciary during parliamentary budget deliberations.[12] This approach constitutes a direct attack on the foundations of a democratic state.

To implement this intention, a significant reduction in funds allocated to the CT was made during the drafting of the Budget Act. According to the draft Budget Act submitted to the Sejm on 30 September 2024, the CT's total expenditure was set at PLN 63,450 thousand. Of this, PLN 17,545 thousand was allocated to benefits for individuals, PLN 45,052 thousand to the budget unit's current expenditure, and PLN 853 thousand to capital expenditure.

During the Sejm proceedings, amendments to the Budget Act were adopted, resulting in a reduction in CT expenditure of PLN 10,834 thousand (to PLN 52,616 thousand). The main reduction was in the category of current expenditure, which was cut by PLN 10,634 thousand (to PLN 34,418 thousand). Of this, PLN 10,230 thousand was cut from personal expenses for the payment of remuneration to CT judges.[13]

This reduced amount corresponds to the total annual salary of all CT judges. The Chairman of the Sejm Public Finance Committee, MP Janusz Cichoń, clearly indicated the purpose of the introduced change. During the session on 21 November 2024, in reference to changes in CT expenditure, he stated that CT judges ‘do not have the legitimacy to adjudicate, in our opinion’, and also admitted that ‘the intention of the applicants was that there would be no funds for the remuneration of the Tribunal's members in this budget. Hence this decision’, and he also admitted that ‘the intention of the applicants was that there would be no funds for the remuneration of the Tribunal's members in this budget.’[14]

On December 6, 2024, the Sejm – in accordance with the recommendation of the Public Finance Committee – passed the Budget Act for 2025 in this form. After considering the Senate amendments (none of which concerned CT expenditure), the Sejm finally adopted the Budget Act on 9 January 2025. The Budget Act was submitted to the President for consideration and, on 17 January 2025, the President signed it into law.

On 26 February 2025, the President of the Republic of Poland submitted a motion to the CT requesting an examination of the conformity of the 2025 Budget Act with the Constitution.[15]

After considering the motion of the President of the Republic of Poland at a hearing, the CT announced a judgement regarding the Budget Act regulations for 2025, which establishes the expenses of the CT, among others. The CT ruled that the Budget Act for 2025 is inconsistent with the Constitution[16] insofar as it establishes the CT's expenses at a lower amount than that provided for in the draft Budget Act for 2025, thereby limiting the CT's ability to perform its constitutionally defined tasks.[17]

In practice, the ruling upholds the financial plans deemed unconstitutional in the Budget Act. The legislator must now amend the Budget Act immediately to align the financial plans with the CT's ruling. Until this is done, the Minister of Finance, as a member of the Council of Ministers, must transfer the necessary financial resources from the appropriate reserve to these bodies to enable them to perform their constitutionally defined tasks, including the payment of personnel expenses.[18]

However, the Minister of Finance refused to enforce the CT's judgement, effectively blocking the transfer of funds to the CT's bank account. This was made clear in a letter to the CT's President dated 30 April 2025, among other communications. This means that the Constitution is being violated further and the CT's activities may be permanently paralysed.[19]


[1] Article 10 (2) of the Constitution: Legislative power shall be vested in the Sejm and the Senate, executive power shall be vested in the President of the Republic of Poland and the Council of Ministers, and the judicial power shall be vested in courts and tribunals.

Article 173 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland (Journal of Laws 1997.78.483 of 1997.07.16):The courts and tribunals shall constitute a separate power and shall be independent of other branches of power.

[2] Article 175 (1) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland (Journal of Laws 1997.78.483 of 1997.07.16): The administration of justice in the Republic of Poland shall be implemented by the Supreme Court, the common courts, administrative courts and military courts.

[3] Article 188 of the Constitution.

[4] Article 189 of the Constitution.

[5] Article 194 (1) of the Constitution.

[6] Article 195 (1) of the Constitution.

[7] Article 10 of the Constitution. See footnote 2.

[8] Article 195 (2) of the Constitution.

[9] J. Mikołajewicz, Kilka uwag o legitymizacji Trybunału Konstytucyjnego w kontekście obsady stanowisk sędziowskich [w:] Wykładnia konstytucji. Aktualne problemy i tendencje, red. M. Smolak, Warszawa 2016.

[10] T. Dębowska-Romanowska, Prawo finansowe. Część konstytucyjna wraz z częścią ogólną, Warszawa 2010, s. 52-53.

[13] Capital expenses were also reduced by PLN 200 thousand - to the currently applicable amount of PLN 653 thousand.  See: www.trybunal.gov.pl/wiadomosci/uroczystosci-spotkania-wyklady/art/raport-ekspertow-tk.

[16] with Article 10, Article 188 and Article 189 in conjunction with Article 195, Section 2 of the Constitution.

[17] Judgement of the Constitutional Tribunal of 6 May 2025, K 2/25, OTK-A 2025, no. 51; www.trybunal.gov.pl/postepowanie-i-orzeczenia/wyroki/art/ustawa-budzetowa-na-2025-r-3.

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