The Right to Pay in Cash (Finally) Before the Constitutional Court
Following the example of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic, the National Assembly decided in April 2025 to enshrine the right to pay in cash in the Fundamental Law of Hungary (25 April 2011).[1] The constitutional amendment was deemed necessary in order to prevent total dependence on electronic financial systems, and to provide accessibility to cash under all circumstances, thus avoiding economic isolation.[2] Since then, the legislator has taken certain measures to ensure the effectiveness of the right concerned in the field of consumer protection regulation,[3] and has also required payment service providers to enable cash withdrawal service for everyone by installing ATMs in each municipality.[4] Nonetheless, the quite sparse constitutional provision, incorporated into Article XIII alongside the right to property and the right to inheritance, does not define adequately the constitutive elements of the newly emerged fundamental right.[5]
Although this hiatus has not yet drawn the attention of Hungarian legal scholars, the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights (hereinafter: Commissioner) ‘broke the silence’ on 16 September 2026, having submitted a motion (hereinafter: Commissioner’s motion), in accordance with the powers conferred upon it by Article 38 of Act CLI of 2011, to the Constitutional Court of Hungary (hereinafter: Constitutional Court) with a view to gaining a comprehensive, authentic interpretation.[6] The document explicitly states that the initiative is not an act aimed to resolve the ‘omission’ of the drafter of the amendment resulting in a ‘doctrinal lacuna’ but is rooted in pressing social demand for clarification: a number of petitions received by the Office of the Commissioner argued that the use of cash as a means of exchange was not possible in connection with services provided through automated retail establishments and during certain cultural, gastronomic, sport and leisure events. Furthermore, complaints were also filed that parking fees could no longer be paid with cash in certain areas of the capital city from July 2026, a tendency directly allowed and supported by an amendment of the pertinent municipal decree.[7]
As the above examples demonstrate, thus far, the right to pay in cash has been functioning as if it were a mere declarative norm, allowing exceptions defined by any state organ with legislative power. Therefore, despite being enshrined in the Fundamental Law, the right concerned lacks the normative characteristics of a substantive constitutional right. The Commissioner has raised two questions before the Constitutional Court explicitly, while implicitly referring to a third dilemma. In this regard, certain considerations must be emphasised.
The first question refers to the positive aspect, i.e. how the right may be exercised. ‘When fulfilling payment obligations, provided that the legal relationship and the method of performance do not objectively preclude payment in cash, can [the individual] choose to pay in cash?’[8] If we rephrase the question, calling the individual exercising the right ‘payer’ and the counterparty ‘payee’, we will be able to observe the imminent problem from the opposite perspective. Is the payee obligated to accept cash payment from the payer, given that the proposed payment method this method of payment remains objectively feasible in the actual context? In this respect, it is obvious that the Constitutional Court cannot declare the absolute nature of the fundamental right concerned since exercising it automatically creates an obligation for another individual. Even if each state organ were required to respect one’s right to pay in cash under all circumstances, which, as the example of the General Assembly of Budapest has demonstrated, is seemingly not the case, imposing such a standard on everyone in every possible situation would be disproportionate. Consequently, the true aim of the positive aspect of the right to pay in cash is to affect relationships governed by private law, that is to say, the classic vertical scope is of secondary significance compared to the horizontal scope (Drittwirkung).
Originally introduced by the Federal Constitutional Court of Germany (Bundesverfassungsgericht) in the Lüth case,[9] the Hungarian Constitutional Court practice has been reluctant to adopt the concept of Drittwirkung as a rule of general applicability, but its use is by no means devoid of precedent. More than two years after the entry into force of the Fundamental Law, the Constitutional Court laid down the theoretical foundations, ruling that fundamental rights and constitutional values are not directly applicable but have to be taken into consideration when courts interpret substantive private law. It is also emphasised that the aforementioned rights and values shall exert an indirect, radiating effect through the general clauses of private law. Therefore, courts are required to have regard to these constitutional provisions in their reasoning, however, such an evaluation shall not lead to a result contrary to explicit private law provisions.[10] Promptly thereafter, a famous decision related to FX loan litigation reinforced the concept of horizontal scope, identifying the principle of good faith and fair dealing as one of the general clauses of the Hungarian Civil Code through which the constitutional protection exerts its effect.[11] In 2015, the Constitutional Court laid down a further requirement, declaring that the limitation test of Article I(3) of the Fundamental Law, while primarily binding upon the legislator, shall also be applied by courts in cases involving (potential) restriction of fundamental rights within the interpretative framework of relevant private law provisions.[12] Pokol Béla, former Justice of the Constitutional Court, emphasised in his dissenting opinion that the universal horizontal effect of fundamental rights cannot be endorsed, warning that it would disrupt traditional Hungarian private law doctrine.[13] In fact, in the subsequent decisions the interpretation of the horizontal scope varies on a case-to-case basis, i.e. Drittwirkung is applied differently depending on the fundamental rights issue concerned.[14]
Having identified the open question of applicability, which will most probably be settled by the upcoming decision of the Constitutional Court, the next logical step is to examine the ‘implicit’ dilemma posed by the Commissioner, namely which limitation test seems the most adequate to apply in connection with the right to pay in cash.[15] One option could be the aforementioned general limitation test that requires the fulfilment of several criteria for a restriction to be justifiable: it shall (i) be laid down in an Act, i.e. no inferior source of law; (ii) have a legitimate aim – allowing the effective use of another fundamental right or protecting a constitutional value; (iii) pass the test of necessity and proportionality; (iv) respect the essential content of the restricted fundamental right. On the other hand, based on a systematic interpretation, the specific test applied in the case of the right to property, i.e. the public interest test, may provide a more coherent approach.[16] However, the right to pay in cash, if applied horizontally, will likely cause conflicts between payers and payees on an everyday basis. Such a jurisprudential challenge requires a specific test even more permissive than the public interest test; put another way, the Constitutional Court is tasked with defining the scope of the (constitutional) right to refuse cash payment as the structural counterpart to the right to pay in cash. A casuistic approach may offer the most feasible solution by delineating a non-exhaustive list of exceptions, which can be expanded incrementally as circumstances require. In this regard, given the imperative of ensuring compliance with EU law, the relevant norms of the proposal for a regulation on the legal tender of euro banknotes and coins[17] could serve as an appropriate baseline. Nonetheless, a doctrinal approach of this nature is rather alien to Hungarian fundamental rights jurisprudence. When balancing opposite interests of payers and payees, the mandatory application of another general clause of the Hungarian Civil Code, the principle of generally expected standard of conduct, could remedy this structural anomaly.
Although the interpretative problem related to the horizontal scope of the right concerned might seem the primary issue, the Constitutional Court must also address its vertical scope – specifically whether, and to what extent, the Hungarian State is bound by an objective duty of institutional protection. Firstly, it can be argued that no state body shall, without proper justification, deprive the citizens of the possibility to choose cash payment when fulfilling their obligations. From this perspective, the above-mentioned amendment of the municipal decree of the General Assembly of Budapest will likely necessitate revision. Nevertheless, the scope of positive obligations will potentially be subject to dispute. As a prerequisite of enabling cash payment, the existence of a means of exchange in physical form is essential. Consequently, it shall be declared that the right to pay in cash implicitly encompasses the constitutional guaranty of legal tender issuance, which extends to an inherent obligation of the Central Bank of Hungary. This state obligation may embody the so-called essential content of the right in question.[18] Once the availability of cash is provided, it can be debated whether and how the accessibility shall also be guaranteed. Via Act XVIII of 2025, which rendered the installation of ATMs mandatory within the area of each municipality, the Hungarian legislator took a step towards an interpretation supporting the pro arguments. Moreover, the acceptance of cash payment by other parties is also indispensable, which leads our line of reasoning back to the dilemmas related to the horizontal scope. As a final remark, EU law compliance considerations shall be made, especially in light of the recent opinion of the European Central Bank related, among others, to the 15thamendment.[19] As a Member State of the European Union, Hungary has undertaken the legal obligation to join the eurozone once the so-called Maastricht criteria are met. The opinion emphasised that, when the accession successfully takes place, a conflict would automatically emerge between EU law and domestic regulation since the right of issuance of euro exclusively belongs to the European Central Bank, thus such a constitutional obligation, as implicitly enshrined by the Fundamental Law, cannot be tolerated. Similar observations have been made in opinions on the Slovak and Slovenian amendments.[20]
Through the example of the right to pay in cash, it has been clearly demonstrated that the introduction of a laconic norm into a chiselled constitutional framework can cause major uncertainties and may result in a need to revise firmly established dogmatic tenets. Thus, Commissioner’s motion presented the Constitutional Court with a complex dilemma. It was tasked to lay the foundations for a pragmatic doctrine for a recently enshrined fundamental right. Simultaneously, it must prevent systemic anomalies, while ensuring consistency and adherence to EU law. Furthermore, in light of recent political developments, the drafting procedure of a new constitution probably commences soon. Given the pro-EU stance of the new Government of Hungary, it is highly probable that concerns of the European Central Bank will be accommodated. Therefore, the analysed right and its nascent doctrine may become an ephemeral feature of the Hungarian constitutional landscape.
[1] To date, this new tendency has been followed by the Republic of Slovenia and the Swiss Confederation.
[2] 15th Amendment of the Fundamental Law of Hungary, preamble, para. [6].
[3] See: Act LXII of 2025 on the amendments to certain acts relating to the use of cash.
[4] See: Act XVIII of 2025 on the installation of ATMs.
[5] In contrast, the amendments of the Slovak and Slovenian constitutions provide much clearer pictures regarding the content of the right in question. As a result, there has been no relevant constitutional court decisions issued.
[6] The Commissioner for Fundamental Rights’ motion seeking an interpretation of Article XIII(1) of the Fundamental Law (the right to pay in cash) – Case no. X/02407/2026. [Online]. Available at: https://public.mkab.hu/dev/dontesek.nsf/0/1e8e614d19fa4cbcc1258e75005b0448/$FILE/X_2407_0_2026_ind_anonim._Redacted.pdf (Accessed: 27 September 2026).
[7] Commissioner’s motion, p. 2. For the regulation of parking in the capital city, see: Annex 6 of Municipal Decree No. 30/2010 (4. VI.) of the General Assembly of Budapest on the standardisation of parking regulations, parking charges and the regulation of the storage of inoperable vehicles within the administrative area of the capital city of Budapest, as amended by Municipal Decree No. 28/2024 (6. XII.) of the General Assembly of Budapest.
[8] Commissioner’s motion, p. 1.
[9] For a brief summary, see: Stein, S.K. (2022) ‘Lüth and Elfes – A German Approach to a Horizontal Effect of Fundamental Rights’, IACL-AIDC Blog, 14 June. [Online]. Available at: https://blog-iacl-aidc.org/new-blog-3/2022/6/14/lth-and-elfes-a-german-approach-to-a-horizontal-effect-of-fundamental-rights (Accessed: 27 September 2026).
[10] Decision 8/2014 (20. III.) of the Constitutional Court, paras. [54]–[56] and [64] of the Reasoning. See also: Article 28 of the Fundamental Law.
[11] Decision 34/2014 (14. XI.) of the Constitutional Court, para. [94] of the Reasoning. This decision also stated that, based on the text of the National Avowal and Article M(2) of the Fundamental Law, courts shall also take action against unfair competition and the abuse of a dominant position, thus protecting consumers’ rights. See: para. [51] of the Reasoning.
[12] Decision 3/2015 (2. II.) of the Constitutional Court, para. [21] of the Reasoning.
[13] Decision 3/2015 (2. II.) of the Constitutional Court, paras. [78]–[79].
[14] For an overview of the relevant decisions from the 2010s, see: Gárdos-Orosz, F., Bedő, R. (2018) ‘Az alapvető jogok érvényesítése a magánjogi jogviták során – az újabb alkotmánybírósági gyakorlat (2014-2018)’, Alkotmánybírósági Szemle, 9(1), pp. 8–13.
[15] Commissioner’s motion, p. 4.
[16] The specific test was first laid down in para. IV of the Reasoning of Decision 64/1993 (22. XII.) of the Constitutional Court; since then, its applicability in the framework of the Fundamental Law has been confirmed by several subsequent constitutional rulings. Nevertheless, it is worth mentioning that in cases concerning the right to inheritance, also incorporated in Article XIII of the Fundamental Law, the general test shall be applied according to para. [24] of the Reasoning of Decision 24/2023 (5. XII.) of the Constitutional Court. Pertinent literature suggested that this might point to the need for a revision of the current specific limitation test applied in connection with the right to property. Patyi, A. Téglási, A. (2025) ‘A tulajdonhoz való jog korlátozásának alkotmányossági kérdései – Gondolatok és felvetések az örökléshez való jog legújabb tendenciáinak apropóján’, KözigazgatásTudomány, 5(2), pp. 15–16.
[17] European Commission: Proposal for a Regulation of the European Union and of the Council on the legal tender of euro banknotes and coins, Brussels, 28.6.2023, COM(2023) 364 final, especially Articles 5 and 6.
[18] It is worth mentioning here that the relevant provisions of the Constitutions of the Slovak Republic and of the Swiss Confederation explicitly enshrine this constitutive element.
[19] Opinion of the European Central Bank of 25 June 2025 on access to cash and a constitutional right to payment in cash (CON/2025/14).
[20] For a summary on these opinions, see: Lindt, R. (2026) ‘A készpénzzel történő fizetéshez való jog az európai monetáris politika árnyékában, avagy az Európai Központi Bank és az új alapjog viszonya’, Miskolci Jogi Szemle, 21(1), pp. 90–94.
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