Constitutional Accountability and the Resilience of the Rule of Law
- Julia Starybrat

- May 9
- 6 min read
On March 24, 2026, scholars and legal experts gathered at the Polish-Hungarian Scientific Forum to address one of the most pressing issues in contemporary constitutional systems: the constitutional accountability of state bodies. The conference, organized by the Central European Academy at the University of Miskolc in collaboration with academic partners, provided a space for critical reflection on the state of the rule of law, particularly in light of recent events in Poland.
By combining perspectives from constitutional, criminal, and international law, the event aimed not only to analyze the existing legal framework but also to assess its practical effectiveness. The organizers’ intention was to move beyond purely doctrinal considerations and address the actual functioning of legal systems operating under conditions of political and institutional tension. In this sense, the conference served both as an academic forum and as a space for broader reflection on the resilience of constitutional orders in Central Europe. The starting point for the discussion was a fundamental question: Do existing accountability mechanisms truly protect the constitutional order and citizens, or have they been weakened and politicized? This issue reflects broader tensions observed across Europe, where formal adherence to legal frameworks can coexist with practices that undermine their actual substance. Increasingly, what becomes crucial is not whether accountability exists in law, but whether it retains the capacity to function effectively in practice.
This issue takes on particular complexity within a legal environment shaped by the interplay between national constitutional systems and supranational legal orders. While international and European mechanisms are often presented as strengthening accountability, they also raise significant questions regarding the limits of external interference and the preservation of states’ constitutional autonomy. In this context, the challenge lies in striking a balance between effective oversight of public authorities and respect for the fundamental principles of sovereignty and democratic legitimacy. Against this backdrop, the conference aimed to address the question of whether contemporary models of accountability remain capable of fulfilling their function, or whether they require rethinking in light of current institutional and political realities.
The first panel, moderated by Dr. Bartłomiej Oręziak, set a clear intellectual direction for the conference, focusing on the fundamentals of constitutional accountability and challenging assumptions often taken for granted in legal discourse. Prof. Paweł Sobczyk’s opening remarks posed a deliberately provocative question: Could the very practice of applying constitutional accountability itself indicate a weakness in the legal solutions in this area? This approach immediately shifted the discussion beyond the traditional, affirmative understanding of accountability as a guarantee of the rule of law. Prof. Sobczyk pointed out that the growing need to resort to accountability mechanisms may reveal deeper systemic deficits within the constitutional order. In a properly functioning system, institutions operate within clearly defined boundaries, and corrective mechanisms are exceptional in nature. Their frequent activation, however, may indicate a disruption in the normal functioning of the state. This perspective takes on particular significance in contemporary Europe, where legal systems remain formally intact but are increasingly subject to political tensions and reinterpretations. From a more state-centric perspective, this raises concerns that both internal and external pressures may lead to the natural boundaries of constitutional systems being exceeded, forcing them to operate in a mode of permanent correction rather than stability.
The second presentation, delivered by Dr. Bartłomiej Oręziak, shifted the discussion to the level of international and European law. His paper addressed the responsibility of the state and its organs for a constitutional coup in light of international and EU law. Dr. Oręziak analyzed how supranational legal orders address situations in which there is a fundamental violation of a state’s constitutional order. In doing so, he posed a key question: Is international and European law capable of effectively responding to such crises without overstepping the boundaries of state sovereignty? This issue is particularly sensitive in the context of the European Union, where the rule of law is sometimes used as a basis for interventionist actions. From a more sovereignty-oriented perspective, there is a fear of the instrumentalization of legal standards. If supranational mechanisms serve not only to protect values but also to influence internal political systems, the line between legal responsibility and political interference may become blurred.
The third presentation, delivered by Prof. Agata Kosieradzka-Federczyk, addressed the autonomy of local government and its relationship with the central government. The analysis focused on the seemingly technical issue of the scope of local government bodies’ freedom of action, which, however, quickly revealed its broader constitutional dimension. The speaker demonstrated that the manner in which powers are divided between the central and local levels has a direct impact on accountability mechanisms. Excessive centralization can lead to the concentration of accountability and its politicization, while the dispersion of powers makes it difficult to assign accountability to specific entities. This presentation highlighted the tension inherent in contemporary governance systems—the need to reconcile decentralization with effective oversight. From the state’s perspective, this balance is of crucial importance not only for administrative efficiency but also for maintaining the coherence of the legal system.
The panel concluded with a discussion in which the participants addressed the issues raised. A picture emerged of a system in which accountability mechanisms exist in theory, but their effectiveness depends on a number of non-legal factors.
The second panel, moderated by Prof. Paweł Sobczyk, focused on more specific and practical aspects of how accountability mechanisms function, shifting the discussion from general principles to real institutional challenges. In contrast to the first panel, which was more diagnostic and theoretical in nature, this part of the session demonstrated how accountability mechanisms work — or fail to work — in practice.
Dr. Grzegorz Ocieczek was the first to speak, analyzing the activities of the prosecutor’s office during the crisis of the rule of law in Poland. His remarks focused on the role of the prosecutor’s office as one of the key bodies responsible for enforcing legal accountability. He emphasized that, in theory, prosecutors serve as guardians of legality; however, in practice, their constitutional position makes them particularly susceptible to political and institutional influences. Dr. Ocieczek noted that in a crisis of the rule of law, the prosecutor’s office may find itself in a kind of “tension zone” between the formal obligation to apply the law and actual political constraints. As a result, a body that should be one of the pillars of the accountability system may itself become a factor in its weakening. From the perspective of a more traditional understanding of the state, this underscores the importance of stable and clearly defined institutional safeguards that protect key institutions from excessive interference.
Dr. Bartosz Lewandowski then discussed the limitations on the criminal liability of constitutional state bodies, using Poland as an example. His presentation focused on one of the most problematic aspects of the liability system — the limits on holding the highest state bodies criminally liable. Dr. Lewandowski pointed out that existing regulations, though often justified by the need to ensure the continuity of state operations and protect its stability, can lead to significant gaps in the accountability system. This applies in particular to situations where the actions of state authorities formally fall within the scope of applicable law but raise serious doubts from the perspective of constitutional standards. This presentation highlighted the tension between two values: on the one hand, the need to ensure effective accountability; on the other, the necessity of protecting the state’s institutional stability. From a more conservative perspective, the question arises as to whether an excessive expansion of criminal liability would lead to the destabilization of the system, while its limitation might foster impunity.
Prof. Marcin Wielec’s subsequent presentation addressed evidentiary issues related to proving constitutional violations. His analysis focused on the practical difficulties involved in translating systemic violations into the language of evidence law. Prof. Wielec emphasized that many actions raising constitutional concerns are diffuse, complex, and often formally justified. As a result, it is extremely difficult to identify specific behaviors that could form the basis for legal liability. Even in situations where a violation of standards seems obvious from an axiological perspective, proving it in legal proceedings faces serious obstacles. He also pointed out that the high evidentiary threshold, which guarantees the integrity of proceedings, simultaneously limits the possibility of effectively enforcing liability in more complex cases. On the one hand, lowering this threshold could lead to abuse and the politicization of proceedings; on the other hand, maintaining it may result in the practical ineffectiveness of liability mechanisms.
The panel concluded with a discussion that once again highlighted the complexity of the relationship between legal norms and political reality. The participants unanimously pointed out that the problem of accountability does not stem solely from a lack of appropriate regulations, but rather from the difficulty of applying them amid institutional and political tensions.
The conclusions drawn from this part of the conference led to the reflection that constitutional accountability cannot be analyzed in isolation from the broader context of the state’s functioning. Its effectiveness depends not only on the quality of legal regulations but also on the stability of institutions, legal culture, and the actual balance of powers.
The conference concluded with a speech by Prof. Paweł Sobczyk, who summarized the main conclusions of the proceedings. He emphasized that the accountability of the state’s constitutional bodies is not a static category, but a dynamic one, requiring constant reflection and adaptation to changing political realities.




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