Reflections on the CJEU’s Judgments in the ‘Hungarian Erasmus Cases’
On 30 September 2026, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) delivered its judgments in the actions brought by six Hungarian universities contesting the restriction of Erasmus+ and Horizon Europe funds under the Conditionality Regulation. The Court dismissed the universities’ actions for annulment, finding a sufficiently direct link between the breach of the rule of law with the establishment of public interest trusts and its impact on the Union budget. This piece discusses the legal significance of the judgments and their implications for the future.
The Background of the Dispute
The judgments adopted on 30 September 2026 originated from actions brought by six Hungarian universities: the University of Debrecen (Case T-115/23), the University of Óbuda (T-132/23), the University of Veterinary Medicine (T-133/23), Semmelweis University (T-138/23), the University of Miskolc (T-139/23), and the University of Dunaújváros (T-140/23). The applicants sought the annulment of Article 2(2) of Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022, which prohibited the European Commission to enter into legal commitments with public interest trust established on the basis of the Hungarian Act IX of 2021.[i] This Act removed several universities, including the six applicants, from the pool of institutions directly managed and financed by the State, and transferred their founding and management rights to public interest trusts.
The issues related to public interest trusts were among the five major concerns of the Commission in the conditionality mechanism regarding Hungary,[ii] particularly because of the non-application of public procurement and conflict of interest rules to public interest trusts.[iii] While the Council Implementing Decision took note of the legislative changes in Hungary that aimed at ensuring the transparency of the use of Union funds by such trusts, it also noted that the regulatory framework still did not prevent top-level officials, including senior political executives from the National Assembly and Hungary’s autonomous bodies, from sitting on boards of public interest asset management foundations, as repeatedly requested by the Commission.[iv] Thus, the Council concluded that the risk of conflict of interest remained inadequate, and could therefore be best addressed by a prohibition on entering into new legal commitments with any public interest trust and any entity maintained by them under any programme under direct or indirect management.[v]
The key measure under the contested provision of the Council Implementing Decision was, in practice, the suspension of Erasmus+ (and Horizon Europe) funds for the affected universities. However, several applicants pointed out that the effect of the contested provision on the Erasmus+ mobility programme was not yet clear at the time, and it was not until September 2024 that it became clear that the Council Implementing Decision also applied to this programme. The applicant universities, therefore, sought the annulment of the contested provision, which restricts them from participating in the Erasmus+ programme.
The Court’s Rulings
Although the six applicant universities raised largely similar pleas, the pleas raised were not identical across all cases. The Court identified seven identical pleas in Óbudai Egyetem v Council, Állatorvostudományi Egyetem v Council, Miskolci Egyetem v Council, Dunaújvárosi Egyetem v Council; five pleas in Semmelweis Egyetem v Council, and 17 pleas in Debreceni Egyetem v Council. Given the limited scope of this piece, the present analysis will focus on three arguments selected on their relevance for understanding the broad context of the cases.
The breach of the principle of proportionality was a central argument in all the six cases. The applicants argued that less restrictive measures could adequately protect the EU’s financial interests, while the broad prohibition imposed disproportionate financial, professional and reputational consequences on the universities concerned. The Court noted, however, that the prohibition to enter into new legal commitments was the least onerous and the least disruptive of the five measures listed in Article 5(1)(a) of the Conditionality Regulation. In addition, the Court also pointed out that the Council Implementing Decision did not affect Hungary’s obligations towards final recipients or beneficiaries, which demonstrates that the Council took into consideration the effects of the measure on them.
However, considering that the measures had a direct impact on the final recipients or beneficiaries of the EU funds, as it practically restricted student mobility and participation in other programmes, it can be questioned whether the Court’s proportionality assessment sufficiently took into account the disproportionate consequences for individuals who have no involvement in the alleged rule of law deficiencies. This is particularly interesting in light of the fact that the Commission’s proposal on the Conditionality Regulation explicitly pronounces in the Explanatory Memorandum ‘the need to ensure that the consequences fall on those responsible for identified shortcomings’ and states that ‘the individual beneficiaries of EU funding, such as Erasmus students, researchers or civil society organisations, cannot be considered responsible for such breaches’.
In addition, several applicants contested the genuine and sufficient link between the breaches of the principles of the rule of law and the impact on the Union budget. In connection with this, the Court pointed out that that the adoption of the contested measure was explained by the risk of conflicts of interest deriving from the possibility for top-level officials and senior political executives to sit on the boards of public interest trusts. The Court accepted the Council’s arguments that the risk of conflicts of interest could interfere with the selection of beneficiaries based on political considerations. Based on this, the Court found a sufficient link between the breaches of the rule of law and the protection of the EU funds.
Furthermore, the University of Debrecen further argued that the funding restrictions infringed academic freedom, as protected by Article 13 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, as its affected teachers, researchers and students were at a disadvantage compared to those universities whose form had not changed. The Court, however, concluded that the contested provision constituted a measure of financial nature and did not contain any prohibition or requirement relating to the academic or scientific activities of the affected universities. With this, the Court adopted a narrow approach on academic freedom by focusing on the legitimacy of the funding restrictions and did not consider the practical implications of the measures for academic research and mobility.
As pointed out above, the applicants raised several other pleas including the competence of the Council to adopt the contested provisions, the breach of the obligation to state reasons, the infringement of the Conditionality Regulation, or the existence of a breach of the principles of the rule of law, the Court rejected those as well, primarily because of procedural reasons.
What’s Next?
Although the judgments raise important questions concerning the scope of the measures adopted in the conditionality mechanism addressing Hungary, their implications seem to remain theoretical, as the Council repealed Decision 2022/2506 on 12 October 2026, which contained the provision contested in the judgments. The Council’s decision was based on the new Hungarian government’s remedial measures under the conditionality mechanism, which included the commitment to the termination of public interest trusts that perform higher education activities by 1 August 2027. Ultimately, it can be concluded that the ‘Hungarian Erasmus cases’ were embedded in a broader dispute between Hungary and the Commission on the rule of law, it is particularly regrettable that students and researchers have borne the consequences of this dispute, with their educational and academic opportunities caught in the crossfire.
[i] For some preliminary reflections on the debate, see Krajnyák, E. (2024) Rule of Law and Academic Freedom (?): Reflections on Hungary’s Case with the Planned Suspension of Erasmus+ and Horizon Europe Funds, Constitutional Discourse. Available at: https://constitutionaldiscourse.com/rule-of-law-and-academic-freedom-reflections-on-hungarys-case-with-the-planned-suspension-of-erasmus-and-horizon-europe-funds/.
[ii] On the conditionality mechanism, see Bóka, J. (ed.) 2024. The Supranational Interpretation of the Rule of Law. Miskolc–Budapest: Studies of the Central European Professors’ Network, pp. 224–235; 333–341; 404–408.
[iii] Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506 of 15 December 2022 on measures for the protection of the Union budget against breaches of the principles of the rule of law in Hungary, Recital 11.
[iv] Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506, supra, Recitals 42-43.
[v] Council Implementing Decision (EU) 2022/2506, supra, Recital 62.
Comments