Serbia on the Eurpean Path, or "Something in between Somewhere in between"

https://doi.org/10.63189/UHKK8748

1. Introduction

A Serbian folk saying goes: “Who strikes early grabs two fortunes.” Lawyers also often use the saying, attributed to the nineteenth-century jurist Valtazar Bogišić: “What is born with a hump, time does not straighten.”^[1] The Serbian poet Matija Bećković states: “Kosovo is the most expensive Serbian word - we have no deeper spiritual properties than Kosovo, nothing that would be in the peaceful possession of our reason.”  In the 80s of the last century in Yugoslavia, a popular film was ‘Something in Between’, which, through the fate of two friends and their emotional relationships with an American journalist girl, described the mentality of people in the Balkans and the ‘mentality’ of Yugoslavia, which was neither East nor West, but something in between and somewhere in between.

2. “Who strikes early…”

Strong supporters of European integration will say that Serbia is late, because in the 1990s, instead of accepting the extended hand and becoming a stable democracy, it chose the dictatorship of Slobodan Milošević and participation in war and other conflicts in the territory of the former SFRY. Zečević claims that the Kingdom of Yugoslavia was “one of the main initiators for the creation of the EU” and that “Serbia failed to use this historical fact in the right way and fit it into the framework of its foreign policy.”^[2] Although there is some truth in these assessments, the fact is that global geopolitical factors (the fall of the Berlin Wall, the collapse of the USSR and the end of the Cold War) had a predominant impact on a “European division of cards” in the Balkans.

What the advocates of Serbia’s earlier entry into the European Community lightly pass over is that no sign of equality could be placed between Yugoslavia and Serbia. Serbia regained its full sovereignty and constituted itself as an independent state only with the Constitution of Serbia of 2006. That constitution - amended only once in 2022 with the aim of constitutional reforms in the field of judiciary to speed up Serbia’s European integration - rests on one apparent inconsistency. That inconsistency was not the result of a mistake or an oversight by the constitution maker. It was purposefully incorporated into the foundations of the constitutional system. The preamble of the constitution, referring to the “state tradition of the Serbian people and the equality of all citizens and ethnic communities in Serbia”, gives a central place to Kosovo and Metohija “as an integral part of the territory of Serbia”, which has “essential autonomy within the sovereign state of Serbia”. This results in the “constitutional obligations of all state bodies to represent and protect the state interests of Serbia in Kosovo and Metohija in all internal and external political relations.” Therefore, this preamble unequivocally defines the basic elements of the national constitutional identity. Serbia is a civil democracy, because it rests on the equality of all citizens and ethnic communities. However, it does not renounce the national source of its constitutionality - the tradition of the Serbian people. Accordingly, the place of Kosovo and Metohija is particularly highlighted, not only in terms of territory and citizenship, but also in terms of constitutional ‘being’, that is, the state and constitutional ‘credo’. This apparent inconsistency is reinforced by Art. 1 of the Constitution, which reads:

“[The] Republic of Serbia is a state of Serbian people and all citizens who live in it, based on the rule of law and social justice, principles of civil democracy, human and minority rights and freedoms, and commitment to European principles and values.”

There is nothing in this article that would be against the basic EU principles and values. The preamble emphasises the national constitutional identity, while Art. 1 emphasises the European one, which are, or at least should be, ‘two sides of the same coin’.^[3]

The Constitution of 2006, with its apparent inconsistency, opened the door to the path of European integration of Serbia, because everything before that, since the fall of Milošević (2000), were ‘preparatory actions’ in the atmosphere of the ‘EU-euphoria’ of so-called democratic political elites and  legitimate expectations of the then majority of ordinary citizens that the European perspective will finally bring a ‘better life’ after a decade and a half of wars, conflicts, and sanctions. Serbia constitutionally indicated the path of European integration, dressing in the constitutional form of European principles and values its “most expensive word” - Kosovo.

Serbia concluded with the EU the basic legal document on which the entire process of European integration is based in 2008, but the Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) entered into force only in 2013. Serbia submitted an application for membership in December 2009. The European Council adopted the Conclusion on the Granting of Candidate Status to Serbia in March 2012 and made the decision to open accession negotiations only in June 2013. Serbia officially began negotiations on EU accession in January 2014. Thus, Serbia started negotiations a quarter of a century after the fall of the Berlin Wall, almost a decade after the ‘Big Bang’ in 2004,^[4] seven years after the accession of Romania and Bulgaria, and half a year after the accession of Croatia in July 2013. Among the countries of the Western Balkans, Macedonia received candidate status in 2005 but started negotiation in 2022; Montenegro submitted a request in 2008; Albania in 2009 and started negotiations in 2022; Bosnia and Herzegovina in 2016 and started negotiations in 2024. If the events are arranged in this way, it can be said that Serbia was rather late with the beginning of European integration, but that it is in a more favourable situation than other countries of the Western Balkans.

In Serbia, there is a popular folk saying that goes: “Who goes first to girl, gets a girl to him.” However, this is not always the case. Especially, if the ‘girl’ is still attractive in appearance, but she has become a bit tired and doesn't know exactly what and who she wants. At the same time, the ‘guy’ is not entirely sure whether he prefers  a ‘marriage’ or just a kind of ‘relationship’.

3. “What is born as a hump…”

Although Serbia, or rather its various political leaders to date, should not be released from responsibility for omissions, delays and inconsistencies in the European path, it is still impossible not to notice that the policy of conditioning the EU has just reached its  ‘peak ̓ on the example of Serbia. As Slobodan Samardžić explains:

“Serbia ̓s steps towards ‘normalisation’ of its relations with Kosovo has become a crucial condition…Each further step on Serbia ̓s path to integration has been conditioned by some concrete step of the recognition of Kosovo as a new state. This means that instead of setting the goal of full membership ex ante, the process has been transformed into setting the key ex post condition of full recognition of Kosovo ̓s independence.”^[5]

Before the entry into force of the SAA, more than five years after its signing, Belgrade and Pristina, with the mediation of the EU, should have started negotiations on several topics in 2010; Belgrade should have fulfilled all its obligations regarding cooperation with the Hague Tribunal and, instead of the UN mission (UNMIK), as was foreseen by UN Resolution 1244, the EU-EULEX mission should have been installed. The crowning moment of that phase was the First Brussels Agreement in April 2013.^[6] That document, which Serbia formally signed with the EU, served as a political and legal basis for relinquishing Serbia’s governing powers in Kosovo, and for the so-called Kosovo to envisage only one major obligation - to enable the formation of an Association/Community of Serb majority municipalities in Kosovo (ASMM). A decade later, the EU tried to ‘encourage’ dialogue with a new agreement, known as Brussels-Ohrid or the Ohrid Agreement.^[7] It was an agreement proposed at the initiative of Germany and France, full of wording that each party to the agreement can interpret as it sees fit.

One thing is certain: for the Kosovo government of Aljbin Kurti, with a lukewarm approach to the EU, the ASSM is just a Brussels ‘chimera’. Even larger is the Euro-Atlantic chimera about the democratic multi-ethnic state of Kosovo, in which the rule of law is realised and other European values and principles are respected.

4. “Something in between…”

The economic and political, but above all the identity crisis of the EU strengthened the rhetoric of institutional reforms. In fact, those reforms do not exist. This, among other things, produces indecision about the enlargement policy and the modalities of its implementation. The EU must first “look at itself in the mirror” and try to answer what it sees and what it wants to see - not in a year, but in half a century. Ad hoc pragmatic and cosmetic solutions, such as, for example, changes in the Western Balkans accession methodology, only cause greater mutual apathy and deepen uncertainty. Serious, if not tectonic, geopolitical changes in the world are also possible. They are followed by wars in Ukraine and the Middle East. At this moment, it would be pretentious to say that the unipolar world led by one superpower, the USA, is “dead”, but it is an undeniable fact that relations at the global level are far more complex. The world is searching for a new balance. In that complex network, the EU must try to build a more autonomous position than has been the case since its creation until today. Otherwise, it may also be threatened by “Balkanization”.

Speaking of the Balkans, the Roman emperors used to say that the Balkans was the “knock of the world”. The Balkans is a melange of ethnic, religious, cultural and other ingredients that is constantly “boiling”. That is its natural state. This situation should be monitored by a “benevolent guardian” for the sake of world peace. There are, however, always those forces in the world who are not interested in peace, and therefore not in a peaceful Balkans. A strong Serbia is no match for those forces, because whenever Serbia was weak in the 20th century, there was war in the Balkans.

Serbia is economically much stronger than it was in the first decade of the 21st century. This is due to the strict measures of the fiscal policy implemented after 2012, but also to the increasing investments of the EU, as well as the strengthening of the economic partnerships, primarily with the two strongest EU states - France and Germany. However, Serbia is open to economic cooperation with Russia, China, but increasingly with numerous Arab and African countries. Accusations of its further “Putinization”, as a result of its persistence in not imposing sanctions on Russia and its failure to fully align its foreign policy with the EU's foreign and security policy, do not seem to be too much of a concern for President Vučić.

Serbia is on the European path as much as the EU allows and wants. In the meantime, it is strengthening its ties to “all four corners of the world”. It seems that Serbia has learned to “take blows” and not return them immediately. Patience. Persistence. Consistency. Argumentation. That explains why in May 2024 another attempt of the so-called Kosovo to enter the Council of Europe failed and  the Resolution on the genocide in Srebrenica voted by a stretched majority despite the support of the strongest Western countries. In a little more than three months (May – August), Chinese President Xi Jinping, German Chancellor Scholz and French President Macron visit Serbia to conclude a number of important bilateral agreements in the field of economy, security etc. Friendship between Hungarian Prime Minister Orban and Serbian President Vučić is unique among statesmen today.

Is Serbia on the European path or is it somewhere in between? The direct answer to this question seems to become redundant.

^[1] “Quod initio vitiosum est non potest tractu temporis convalescere” (Caton).

^[2] Зечевић, 2018, p. 11.

^[3] See Varga (2020) pp.703-716; Petrov (2022) pp. 177–200.

^[4] Then the following joined the Union: Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Cyprus and Malta.

^[5] Самарџић (2015) p. 146.

^[6] First agreement on principles regulating the normalisation of relations, 2013.

^[7] Agreement on the path to normalisation between Kosovo and Serbia, with Implementation Annex, 2023.

References

Agreement on the path to normalisation between Kosovo and Serbia [online]. Available at: https://www.eeas.europa.eu/eeas/belgrade-pristina-dialogue-agreement-path-normalisation-between-kosovo-and-serbia_en (Accessed: 31 August 2024).

Brussels Agreement (First agreement on principles regulating the normalisation of relations) [online]. Available at: https://www.srbija.gov.rs/specijal/en/120394 (Accessed: 31 August 2024).

Constitution of the Republic of Serbia (“Official Herald of the Republic of Serbia”, No. 98/2006 and 115/2021) [online]. Available at: https://www.paragraf.rs/propisi/constitution-of-the-republic-of-serbia.html (Accessed: 31 August 2024).

Petrov, V. (2022) ̔ European Versus National Constitutional Identity in the Republic of Serbia: A Concurrence or Unity ̓ in Pastuszko, G. (ed.) Constitutional Identity and European Union axiology – perspective of Central European States, Warszawa: CBPE, pp. 177–200; https://eprints.uklo.edu.mk/id/eprint/8140/1/1.Constitutional_identity_www.pdf.

Varga, A.Zs. (2020) ̔ Rule of Law and Constitutional Identities ̓ in Granata-Menghini, Tanyar Z.C. (eds.) Venice Commission Thirty Years of Quest for Democracy through Law 1990 – 2020. Lund: Juristförlaget i Lund, pp. 703–716; https://www.venice.coe.int/webforms/documents/?pdf=CDL-PI(2020)013-bil.

Зечевић, С. (2018), ̔ Европска одредница српске спољне политике [Evropska odrednica spoljne politike] ̓, Европскозаконодавство [Evropsko zakonodavstvo] (2018/63) pp. 9–21.