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Case Assignment to Judges


Before 2017, the assignment of cases to judges, assessors, and court registrars was not expressly regulated by law. Instead, these rules were determined by court presidents. In criminal proceedings, the principle of random case assignment only applied to cases involving crimes punishable by 25 years' imprisonment or life imprisonment.

At that time, it was common practice for division chairpersons to allocate cases in the order in which they were received.

There was widespread argument that this arrangement did not ensure satisfactory external transparency in shaping the court's composition. It also created a risk of manipulating panels through the 'manual' selection of judges for specific cases.[1]

On 11 August 2017, an amendment[2] to the Act on the System of Common Courts[3] introduced the model of determining court composition by drawing lots in Polish common courts.[4]

The selection process was conducted using the Random Case Allocation System (SLPS – the abbreviation from the Polish name), a central IT system employing a random number generator to assign cases and court tasks. The aim was to ensure transparency and objectivity in appointing court panels, protect against manipulation, and thus guarantee the constitutional and conventional right to have a case heard by a competent, independent, impartial, and sovereign court established by law. An additional benefit was that random allocation enabled an equal distribution of work among judges and prevented manipulation in assigning previously manually selected judges.

However, an amendment made by the Minister of Justice to the Rules of Procedure for Common Courts,[5] which came into effect on 1 October 2025, changed this sound regulation. A provision was added to the rules stating: 'If it is necessary to improve the efficiency of the department, the head of the division may decide that cases heard by a panel of three SLPS judges will be assigned to clerks, and the head of the division will appoint the remaining two panel members according to the rules established by the president of the court, after consulting the relevant court's board.'

By taking these actions, Minister Żurek attempted to amend the law by means of a regulation, a lower-level act, which is unacceptable under the hierarchy of legal sources defined by the Constitution.

This also means a de facto departure from the random selection of court panels using an IT tool, and a return to manual selection. This undermines a system whereby judges are assigned to cases at random, independently of anyone's will.

Both during the design phase and after its implementation, the regulation met strong criticism from lawyers. It was argued that solutions concerning the formation of adjudicating panels were so important to the right to a fair trial that they should be regulated by statutes.[6]

Marcin Romanowski, a former deputy minister of justice who sought asylum in Hungary, commented that 'what is now presented as a reform intended to improve the work of the courts actually evokes disturbing associations with mechanisms known from the times of the Polish People's Republic'. Back then, the courts were used as political tools and cases were assigned to judges not according to objective criteria, but according to the authorities' expectations. Waldemar Żurek said: 'I must have people I trust in the courts' exposes the true intentions of this reform — it is not about improving the justice system, but about controlling and subjugating it to the authorities.'[7] 

Another lawyer commented that the minister's move represents a serious regression in procedural guarantees and will only deepen chaos in the justice system, further undermining public trust in the courts. 'This solution contradicts the content of statutory norms, which it neither supplements, specifies, nor implements, but simply modifies.' The regulation appears to contradict assurances and declarations about restoring the rule of law in Poland — a system based on the rule of law rather than the rule of individuals or groups who use the law instrumentally and arbitrarily to achieve their declared aims, however righteous they may appear. The alarm must therefore be sounded so that, as has been repeatedly emphasised in response to the changes introduced after 2015 which undermine the standards of democratic rule, democracy and the rule of law do not die in silence, and legal communities do not unwittingly contribute to the construction of an unlawful and anti-democratic system.[8]

Interestingly, the Government Legislation Centre raised serious doubts during the drafting phase of the regulation. At the time, it was stated that this solution raised doubts about its compliance with the Act.[9] 

The amendment to the Rules of Procedure blatantly contradicts case law from both the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) and the European Court of Human Rights (EctHR). According to the CJEU, national regulations prohibiting the review of case assignments to judges are inconsistent with EU law. Furthermore, the provisions on a 'court established by law' refer not only to the court's legal basis, but also to its composition and related provisions. Failure to comply with these provisions may render one or more judges participating in a hearing invalid.[10]

Similarly, in its judgment of 19 December 2024 in X and Others v. Slovenia, the ECtHR held that cases within a court should be assigned based on objective, pre-established criteria to guarantee the right to an independent and impartial judge.

The phrase 'established by law' encompasses not only the legal basis for the existence of a 'tribunal', but also the tribunal's compliance with the specific rules governing it, including the composition of the bench in each case.[11]

It should be emphasised that such action violates fundamental constitutional guarantees:


Article 10 of the Constitution – the principle of separation and balance of powers;

Article 176(2) – the system and jurisdiction of courts and proceedings before them are determined exclusively by statute;

Article 175(1) – justice is administered by courts, not by a minister;

Article 178(1) – the independence of judges is guaranteed, but undermined by the ‘manual’ appointment mechanism.

 

Without randomness in case allocation, justice cannot be served. Each case must be randomly assigned so that nobody can influence who hears them. The principles of randomness and the immutability of court composition form the foundation of a fair and transparent court.

However, the new regulation introduced by Minister Waldemar Żurek violates these principles.

Department chairpersons may manually appoint judges to multi-person panels, limiting randomness to the rapporteur alone. It becomes possible to transfer cases between judges without statutory grounds, to suspend assignment of cases, and to change the order in which cases are received. The president of the court may also change the allocation of cases according to his own criteria.

According to the Lawyers for Poland Association, this is reminiscent of communist-era mechanisms, when courts were used as political tool and cases were assigned to judges at random, according to the authorities' or political preferences rather than the law. At that time, court decisions could ruin lives or favour those connected to the system. Although changes were introduced to improve the functioning of the courts, Minister Żurek's regulation paves the way for similar practices, such as the politicisation of the judiciary and the arbitrary assignment of cases to selected judges.

Manipulating the allocation of cases poses a real risk to the integrity of the courts — citizens cannot be certain that their case will be heard by an impartial judge rather than one chosen at random by those in power.[12]


[1] Rzeczpospolita. “Prof. Andrzej Olas o ruchu ministra Żurka: prawnicy muszą bić na alarm.” www.rp.pl/opinie-prawne/art43129031-prof-andrzej-olas-o-ruchu-ministra-zurka-prawnicy-musza-bic-na-alarm

[2] Journal of Laws of 2017, item 1452.

[3] The Act of 27 July 2001 - Law on the System of Common Courts, Journal of Laws 2024.334, i.e. Of 2024.03.08.

[4] Article 47a, paragraph 1 of the Act on the System of Common Courts, as amended at that time, provides that: 'Cases are assigned to judges and assessors randomly, within specific case categories, unless the case is assigned to a judge on duty.'

[5] The regulation of the Minister of Justice of 18 June 2019 - Rules of Procedure of Common Courts (consolidated text: Journal of Laws of 2024, item 867, as amended).

[6] Rzeczpospolita. “RPO o rozporządzeniu Żurka: zmiany w losowaniu sędziów powinny być zamieszczane w ustawie.” www.rp.pl/sady-i-trybunaly/art43139341-rpo-o-rozporzadzeniu-zurka-zmiany-w-losowaniu-sedziow-powinny-byc-zamieszczane-w-ustawie

[7] Brussels Signal. “In Tusk’s Poland, Justice Isn’t Blind.” www.brusselssignal.eu/2025/10/in-tusks-poland-justice-isnt-blind/

[8] Rzeczpospolita. “Prof. Andrzej Olas o ruchu ministra Żurka: prawnicy muszą bić na alarm.” www.rp.pl/opinie-prawne/art43129031-prof-andrzej-olas-o-ruchu-ministra-zurka-prawnicy-musza-bic-na-alarm

[9] Niezależna. “Koniec losowania sędziów: Rządowe Centrum Legislacji ostrzegało Żurka — jest dokument.” www.niezalezna.pl/polska/koniec-losowania-sedziow-rzadowe-centrum-legislacji-ostrzegalo-zurka-jest-dokument/553869

[10] Dziennik Gazeta Prawna. “Czy można kontrolować prawidłowość przydzielania spraw sędziom? – TSUE w...” https://serwisy.gazetaprawna.pl/orzeczenia/artykuly/9668442,czy-mozna-kontrolowac-prawidlowosc-przydzielania-spraw-sedziom-tsue-w.html

[11] The EctHR judgment of 19 December 2024 X AND OTHERS v. SLOVENIA; (Applications nos. 27746/22 and 28291/22); https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/eng?i=001-238568).

[12] Prawnicy dla Polski. 2024. Post on X (formerly Twitter), 2024. https://x.com/PRAWNICYdlaPOL/status/1974750758793789849?t=reG65f2DVhAqivrvxN11-w&s=08; Do Rzeczy. “Prof. Kotowski: problem losowania sędziów.” www.dorzeczy.pl/opinie/789510/prof-kotowski-problem-losowania-sedziow.html

 

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