Serbia between EU Policy Defence and Its or EU Necessity to Deeper Reform
- Vladan Petrov

- 4 days ago
- 10 min read
1. Introduction
An old saying goes: "What doesn't kill you makes you stronger". Applied to Serbia "blocked" from the inside (especially from November 2024)[1] and from the outside (the last cluster, cluster 4, was opened at the end of 2021), it could mean an extremely optimistic forecast – Republic of Serbia, more confident than ever before in its EU path, could in the next few years finally find itself in an expanded, but definitely no longer a select society of EU states.[2] On the other hand, although there is no saying "what spreads you, can kill you", examples from medicine related to human health, but also from history, related to state unions, give the strength to such a saying. If even the strongest state was losing something of its essential state-forming substance or better to say its political identity through the process of territorial expansion, the sooner something like this could happen to an entity that has not yet completely defined its unique legal-political subjectivity. Such an entity is undoubtedly the EU after Maastricht and especially after the last three “enlargement waves” that included the largest number of Eastern and Central European, former real-socialist states.
2. What about the EU today – reform without strategy and a new policy defence
No matter how much an observer is sympathetic to the EU, it would be hard not to assess that the EU has been stuck or, better to say, "blocked", not only in terms of new enlargements (from Croatia in 2013), but also in terms of a sincere and creative attitude towards internal reforms. Let's draw a parallel with human health again. A person who does not move becomes chaotic in thoughts and actions. The absence of a clear life philosophy is most often accompanied by apparently strong, but empty words, without a true readiness to act and change the situation. The internal chaos inevitably leads to external aggressive manifestations. Contemporary EU resembles such a person. Hence, behind old ideas, unskillfully disguised in new clothes, such as those about the admission of new states without full membership (without the right of veto),[3] there is a lack of a clear strategy, even anxiety for the future of that community. For example, at the end of 2024, the famous Brussels mural on which it was written "The future is Europe" was removed. A new European Commission conference center building was erected on that site. That could be interpreted as a symbol of Europe not capable of transforming itself in a community of its citizens, but remaining a rather alienated, bureaucratic structure.
After more than four decades since Maastricht and about three decades since the collapse of the so-called European Constitution, it is clear that the enlargement process is not a matter of ordinary political strategy, but a question of legal-political identification and true political democratization. The EU is nothing like what its creators envisioned. It does not seem to have the prospect of evolving like the American federal model. The issue of enlargement is not a question of defense strategy and foreign policy, but a question of discovering a truly European identity, that substantial minimum of common, true European values. In this sense, it seems that Milan Kundera's famous essay "A Kidnapped West or the Tragedy of Central Europe", from the beginning of the eighties of the last century, can be renamed into "A Kidnapped West or the Tragedy of the EU". That essay begins impressively. "In November 1956, the director of the Hungarian News Agency, shortly before his office was flattened by artillery fire, sent a telex to the entire world with a desperate message announcing that the Russian attack against Budapest had begun. The dispatch ended with these words: 'We are going to die for Hungary and for Europe'." Kundera further explains: "The director of the Hungarian News Agency meant that the Russians, in attacking Hungary, were attacking Europe itself. He was ready to die so that Hungary might remain Hungary and European."[4]
The author of this blog comes from Serbia, a country that has always been and will always be something in between, neither close enough to the West to be demonstrably European, nor far enough from it to be considered an Eastern (read: Russian) province, as some in the West perceive it. Therefore, my position, as well as that of my country, is that we can always be free from temporary ideological-political currents, to say, for example, that Hungary is Europe, but that it is Hungarian first, and then European. That applies or at least should apply equally to every EU Member State, as well as to the one that may one day become its member. Therefore, calling Kundera's director to both Hungary and Europe does not mean drowning Hungary in Europe or identifying it. It can only mean that Hungary is as European as France, Italy, Slovakia or Bulgaria, but it does not stop to be Hungary first. The old formula "unity in diversity" does not mean the process of melting diversity for the sake of centralized unity, but rather the process of preserving diversity for the sake of a more perfect unity. Unfortunately, it seems that this was not, and especially not today, the sincere attitude of Brussels Europe, which seems like an alienated, selfish, but no longer complacent entity. Such a Europe does not recognize that it is killing its original idea and itself in the politics of double standards, turning the enlargement process into a fair of hypocrisy and turning quasi-democratic rhetoric into the rattling of weapons. That is its first huge problem. Inability to introspect. There is no sincere readiness for deeper reform or maybe it is even too late.[5]
When you do not see or ready to see yourself, you also see the world around upside down. I would disagree with Kundera's director in one aspect. He is ready to die for both Hungary and Europe. In 1956 and now in 2025, the geopolitical picture of the world is totally different. Willingness to die is not a good solution. Willingness to talk is much better. The ability to dialogue is even better. Instead of Brussels Europe strengthening its capacity for dialogue, the same one to which it always declaratory invites its insufficiently "obedient" members, such as Hungary and Slovakia, or the states tired of standing in its waiting room without much hope to come in, the EU administration decide on financing the war in Europe and strengthens its "defense", that is, war policy. That is its second huge problem. Inability to look at the tectonically changing modern world. Unwillingness to see the simple truth - the new world will be a multipolar network. In that world, two large, visible power centers (USA and Russia) are trying to talk and through dialogue to reach peace in Ukraine. There are also centers of power that are less visible, but extremely influential. Today's EU is not among them, but it should and could have been. Perhaps this is the voice of a slightly EU-disappointed citizen of Serbia, but "entering such a European Union does not seem rational or tempting. At least until the Brussels bureaucracy comes to its senses".[6]
3. What about Serbia – between the unfair treatment of the EU and its slow internal progress
Is Serbia truly forgotten from the perspective of the declarative intentions of the EU to accept new members or maybe the Western Balkans as a whole? After all, maybe it is still realistic that an illusive political concept such as the concept of the Western Balkans will one day enter the EU as a complete set? Hard to imagine. Just as it was difficult to expect that Serbia would open at least one new cluster (cluster 3) by the end of this year. The last resolution of the European Parliament from October 2025,[7] insisting on full alignment with the EU's foreign security policy, i.e. the introduction of a complete package of sanctions against Russia and the implementation of all from the point of view of Serbian constitutional law and international public law (SC Resolution 1244) disputed provisions of the disputed Ohrid Agreement of 2023,[8] are sufficient indicators that Serbia will not even formally advance on the EU path until further notice. What was enough at the end of 2021 to open cluster 4, which is the adoption of the European exemplary constitutional model of an independent judiciary and autonomous (almost independent) public prosecution,[9] cannot be upgraded with new normative reforms, such as a set of judicial laws (2023-2024), the Law on a unified voter list (2025)[10] and the election of new members of the Regulatory Body for Electronic Media.[11] Simply put, the EU bureaucracy thinks that it is not enough. It is also not worth it that the current political government in Belgrade was tolerant of almost one-year illegal blockades of faculties and the educational process, not only in higher education, but also in primary and secondary schools. The fact that Serbia is, according to the President of the Republic Vučić, "a champion of democracy"[12] is not worth it, although the authorities allowed around 28,000 unregistered assemblies in various locations throughout Serbia, none of which fall into the category of so-called spontaneous assemblies that are legal and legitimate from the point of view of the practice of the European Court of Human Rights. In case of Serbia, precise and demanding legal conditions of political conditioning inherent in EU integrations are still there somewhere. Serbia definitely still has a lot to do in this regard. However, the latest unsuccessful attempt to bring Serbia closer to full EU membership has nothing to do with the legal aspect of the process. It has to do with Brussels' political assessment that Serbia does not fit into its "defense policy". This is the reason why the President of the Republic Vučić did not go to the EU – Western Balkans summit on December 17 and Serbia did not align with the EU – Western Balkans Summit – Brussels Declaration.[13]
When asked what he thought about Serbia not coming to the summit, Prime Minister of Hungary Viktor Orbán said a notorious truth: "So, without Serbia, we cannot do anything. And what is happening here, I mean the treatment and behavior towards Serbia is shameful. So, it is completely unfair. We are behaving in an unacceptable way. Serbia is more than one-third of the population of the Balkans, the region of the Western Balkans, the economy there is at least half Serbian. The exports of this region are probably two-thirds Serbian. So, without Serbia, impossible to do anything in the Western Balkans. That's why the EU must first accept Serbia in order to find a solution to the difficulties, and then negotiate with other countries, not the other way around. We do the exact opposite. That's not good. That's bad etc."[14]
4. Conclusion - the EU (without or with Serbia) a utopian project?
At one time, Margaret Thatcher wrote, "The EU is a classic utopian project, a monument to the vanity of intellectuals, a program whose failure is an inevitable fate."[15] Throughout history, Serbia too has been prone to utopian projects (for example, First and also Second Yugoslavia), which caused it to lose a lot. Serbia will undoubtedly remain therefore on its European path. Whether that path will have a brighter perspective will depend a little on Serbia and a lot on the EU and its complete and systemic reforms. Isn't that a utopian scenario? Or maybe Dragoljub Kojčić, a Serbian political philosopher is absolutely right: "Serbia is on the European path, the question is whether the European Union is on the European path?".[16]
[1] The author alludes to the blockades of faculties and streets that have lasted continuously for more than a year (in the meantime, state faculties have started to work with the presence of remnants of informal groups of students organized in so-called plenums, which represent a kind of parallel extra-legal forms in contrast to the legal and largely "disempowered" student parliaments). See, for example, Petrov, https://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/651258/autonomija-univerziteta-i-studentske-blokade.
[2] According to the messages from the last Forum on EU enlargement in Brussels in November 2025, "enlargement is back in fashion" despite the fact that candidate states like Ukraine, Moldova and Georgia have Russian troops on their territory. Filipović, https://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/711807/no-ve-cla-ni-ce-ni-ka-da-ne-ce-bi-ti-ze-mlje-dru-gog-re-da.
[3] The New Union Post, https://newunionpost.eu/2025/11/06/veto-power-future-eu-members-unanimity/.
[4] Kundera, https://dl1.cuni.cz/pluginfile.php/656024/mod_resource/content/1/Kundera%20The%20Tragedy%20of%20Central%20Europe.pdf.
[5] The words of Vaclav Klaus, the great Czech politician, uttered more than 25 years ago seem quite current and true: "The European Union must implement institutional changes, otherwise it will not be able to act with more than the fifteen members so far... We need not only marginal, incremental and evolutionary changes (and they will eventually come true) but also more radical and revolutionary changes." Klaus, 2010, p. 141.
[6] Samardzija, https://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/712200/pogledi/evro-pa-po-me-ri-sr-bi-je-ili-obrat-no.
[7] European Parliament, https://oeil.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/en/procedure-file?reference=2025/2917(RSP).
[8] See more Petrov, 2025, pp. 176-179.
[9] See more Petrov, 2023, pp. 233-257.
[10] National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, „Official Gazzete of the Republic of Serbia“ No. 104/2009, 99/2011, 44/2024 i 96/2025.
[11] The election procedure for the members of RBEM has not been yet completed in the time of writing this text because of the various forms of obstruction by member candidates coming from a part of non-governmental organizations. Blic, https://www.blic.rs/vesti/politika/novoizabrani-clanovi-saveta-rem-a-zvanicno-podneli-ostavke/ssxqp18.
[12] Vučić, 2025, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mndRXJiZoqQ.
[13] Directorate-General for Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood, https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-western-balkans-summit-brussels-declaration-17-december-2025-2025-12-17_en.
[14] Politika, https://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/718259/orban-srbija-je-kljucna-zemlja-u-regionu-tretman-prema-njoj-je-sramotan.
[15] Ljepojević, 2024, p. 13.
[16] Politika, 2025, p. 6.
References
Blic [online]. 'Četvoro članova Saveta REM zvanično podneli ostavke, predali ih na pisarnici Skupštine Srbije'. Available at: https://www.blic.rs/vesti/politika/novoizabrani-clanovi-saveta-rem-a-zvanicno-podneli-ostavke/ssxqp18 (Accessed: 16 December 2025).
Directorate-General for Enlargement and Eastern Neighbourhood [online]. The EU-Western Balkans Summit Brussels Declaration. Available at: https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/news/eu-western-balkans-summit-brussels-declaration-17-december-2025-2025-12-17_en (Accessed: 20 December 2025).
European Parliament [online]. Resolution on the polarization and increased repression in Serbia, one year after the Novi Sad tragedy 2025/2917(RSP). Available at: https://oeil.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/en/procedure-file?reference=2025/2917(RSP) (Accessed: 19 December 2025).
Filipović, V. [online]. 'The new EU members will not be second-tier countries'. Available at: https://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/711807/no-ve-cla-ni-ce-ni-ka-da-ne-ce-bi-ti-ze-mlje-dru-gog-re-da (Accessed: 3 December 2025).
Klaus, V. (2010), Evropa i EU [Evropa pohledem politika, pohledem ekonoma, Praha, 2001]. Službeni glasnik, Beograd.
Kundera, M. [online]. The Tragedy of Central Europe. Available at: https://dl1.cuni.cz/pluginfile.php/656024/mod_resource/content/1/Kundera%20The%20Tragedy%20of%20Central%20Europe.pdf (Accessed: 20 November 2025).
Ljepojević, S. (2024). Evropa i globalne geopolitičke promene. Službeni glasnik, FB, Beograd. 2
National Assembly of the Republic of Serbia, Zakon o jedinstvenom biračkom spisku ("Official Gazzete of the Republic of Serbia", No. 104/2009, 99/2011, 44/2024 i 96/2025).
The New Union Post [online]. 'Future EU members without veto power. The latest absurd plan to keep the unanimity rule'. Available at: https://newunionpost.eu/2025/11/06/veto-power-future-eu-members-unanimity/ (Accessed: 2 December 2025).
Petrov, V. (2023). 'Judicial Reform in Serbia in Light of the Venetian Concept of the Rule of Law'. Central European Journal of Comparative Law, Volume IV, No. 2, pp. 233-257.
Petrov, V. [online]. 'Autonomija univerziteta i studentske blockade'. Available at: https://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/651258/autonomija-univerziteta-i-studentske-blokade (Accessed: 25 November 2025).
Petrov, V. (2025). 'Serbia and the European Union – Evolution, Dissolution, or Something Third?'. Law, Identity and Values, No. 2, pp. 167-189.
Politika [online]. 'Orban: Srbija je ključna zemlja u regionu'. Available at: https://www.politika.rs/scc/clanak/718259/orban-srbija-je-kljucna-zemlja-u-regionu-tretman-prema-njoj-je-sramotan (Accessed: 19 December 2025).
Politika (2025), 21 December, p. 6.
Samardzija, S. [online]. 'Evropa po meri Srbije ili obratno', Available at: https://www.politika.rs/sr/clanak/712200/pogledi/evro-pa-po-me-ri-sr-bi-je-ili-obrat-no (Accessed: 24 November 2025).
Vučić, A. [online]. SHOCKS Reporters: Serbia Is a Champion of Democracy – Not One Person Was Hurt! Available at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mndRXJiZoqQ (Accessed: 2 December 2025).




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