Commentary on the Judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States in Mahmoud v. Taylor, June 27, 2025.

With particular regard to the right of parents to raise their children in accordance with their beliefs, and the right of children to be brought up in accordance with the beliefs of their parents

https://doi.org/10.63189/HGDO7029

The judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States in Mahmoud v. Taylor, delivered on June 27, 2025 [Supreme Court of the United States, No. 24–297, Tamer Mahmoud, Et Al., Petitioners v. Thomas W. Taylor, Et Al., On Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit, June 27, 2025], constitutes a landmark ruling of the American judiciary concerning both the rights of parents to raise their children in accordance with their religious convictions and the rights of children to be brought up in accordance with those parental beliefs. Importantly, this ruling does not pertain exclusively to the American legal system; rather, it may – and arguably ought to – have broader implications for the protection of fundamental rights of parents and children, including in the context of public education systems in Europe.

The U.S. Supreme Court correctly found that imposing upon young pupils – especially the youngest – mandatory exposure to ideologically charged content related to sexuality and gender identity, without prior parental notification and the right to opt out, constitutes a serious threat to constitutionally protected parental rights under the Free Exercise Clause. In doing so, the Court reaffirmed and applied the principles articulated in the precedent Wisconsin v. Yoder [406 U.S. 205, 1972], holding that such state interference may impermissibly undermine the religious upbringing of children. The Court emphasized that the inclusion of ideologically normative LGBTQ+-themed materials in elementary curricula, coupled with the school district's refusal to allow parental opt-outs, substantially burdened the petitioning parents’ ability to fulfill their religious obligation to raise their children in accordance with their faith [see more in a very good comment: Zsófia Nagy, Parent‘s rights to navigate their children‘s moral upbringing in public schools prevails. Lessons of the Mahmoud v. Taylor case, https://www.ceaclaw.org/post/parent-s-rights-to-navigate-their-children-s-moral-upbringing-in-public-schools-prevails]. The Court’s reaffirmation of Yoder not only reflects a logical extension of constitutional jurisprudence, but also reasserts the necessity of safeguarding familial autonomy against coercive state intrusion in the realm of religious and moral formation.

Factual Background of the Case

The case of Mahmoud v. Taylor concerned the constitutional limits of government interference with parental rights to raise their children in accordance with their religious convictions, specifically in the context of compulsory public education.

During the 2022/2023 scholar year, the Montgomery County Board of Education in the State of Maryland introduced into the elementary school curriculum a set of so-called “LGBTQ+-inclusive” books designated for students from kindergarten through fifth grade. These publications depicted same-sex relationships as fully acceptable and worthy of social affirmation and promoted the idea of separating biological sex from gender identity, suggesting to children, inter alia, that they may determine their gender independently of their biological sex.

In the initial phase of implementing the new educational materials, schools allowed for prior parental notification regarding the intended use of such content and permitted children to be excused from classes whose subject matter might conflict with the family’s religious beliefs – an approach referred to as the “opt-out” policy. This practice was in line with then-applicable Board guidelines regarding respect for religious diversity.

However, in March 2023, the Board altered its policy, eliminating both the obligation to inform parents in advance of such instructional content and the right of students to be excused from participation. The decision was justified by the Board on the grounds of administrative efficiency and the need to preserve student equality.

In response, a group of parents representing diverse religious backgrounds – including Muslim, Catholic, Orthodox Christian, and Jewish communities – and affiliated with the advocacy organization Kids First, filed a federal lawsuit. The plaintiffs alleged violations of their constitutional right to the free exercise of religion under the First Amendment, as well as the parental right to direct the religious upbringing of their children. They sought a preliminary injunction requiring schools to provide advance notice to parents of the use of contested instructional materials and to allow students to opt out of instruction that conflicted with their religious or moral beliefs.

The District Court and the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit denied the requested preliminary relief, holding that the plaintiffs had not shown a sufficient burden on religious exercise within the meaning of established constitutional precedent. Upon review, however, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed those decisions, finding that the school policy – mandating participation in ideologically charged instruction without the possibility of parental objection – constituted a substantial infringement of constitutionally protected parental rights.

Parental Right to Religious Upbringing and the Right of Children to Be Raised in Accordance with Parental Convictions

In Mahmoud v. Taylor, the Supreme Court of the United States focused primarily on the right of parents to raise their children in accordance with their religious beliefs, recognizing this right as one of the fundamental constitutional liberties. Although the Court did not explicitly articulate an individual right of the child to be brought up in accordance with the parents’ convictions, it implicitly and functionally acknowledged such a right by holding that the constitutional protection afforded to parents encompasses the entirety of their educational and formative relationship with their child.

The Supreme Court unequivocally affirmed that the right of parents to direct the upbringing and moral-religious formation of their children – particularly in matters of faith and conscience – lies at the core of the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom under the Free Exercise Clause. In this context, the Court reiterated that: “At its heart, the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment protects “the ability of those who hold religious beliefs of all kinds to live out their faiths in daily life through the performance of” religious acts. Kennedy, 597 U. S., at 524 (internal quotation marks omitted). And for many people of faith across the country, there are few religious acts more important than the religious education of their children. See Our Lady of Guadalupe School v. Morrissey-Berru, 591 U. S. 732, 754 (2020) (“Religious education is vital to many faiths practiced in the United States”) (p. 18). Citing its well-established jurisprudence, including the landmark casen Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court emphasized that the State may not infringe upon parents’ rights to transmit their religious beliefs to their children, particularly where governmental action “substantially interferes” with the process of religious upbringing. The Court explicitly held that religious education of children is itself a religious act and, as such, enjoys full constitutional protection: “The practice of educating one’s children in one’s religious beliefs, like all religious acts and practices, receives a generous measure of protection from our Constitution.” (p. 18).

The Court further underscored that the parental right to guide a child’s moral and spiritual formation does not end at the doorstep of the home; rather, it follows the child into the public school system. The State may not frustrate this right by compelling children to participate in instruction that contradicts their family’s religious convictions. Moreover, the judgment conveys the principle that a child’s formation must not become the subject of institutional contest between parents and public schools. The Court implicitly warned against scenarios in which schools undermine or discredit the value system in which parents exercising their natural and constitutional authority – seek to raise their children.

The Supreme Court of the United States, in Mahmoud v. Taylor, did not identify the child’s right to be raised in accordance with parental [moral and religious] beliefs as an autonomous constitutional right. Nevertheless, the Court acknowledged that the constitutional rights of parents inherently presume the ability to impart their convictions to their children without the risk that public schools – through compulsory instruction – will systematically undermine those beliefs.

In the previously cited case of Wisconsin v. Yoder, the Court noted that compelling children to undergo education in an environment “hostile” to their parents’ religion and generating “pressure to conform” to opposing worldviews threatens not only parental freedom but also the spiritual and moral development of the child: “The compulsory-education law placed Amish children into an environment hostile to Amish beliefs, where they would face pressure to conform to contrary viewpoints.” (p. 21).

With respect to early elementary-aged children (ages 5–11), the Court in Mahmoud emphasized their particular susceptibility to moral instruction delivered by teachers and their inability to distinguish between the presentation of an idea and its endorsement. As a result, children are effectively compelled to internalize normative messages that conflict with their family’s religious teachings a practice the Court deemed constitutionally impermissible.

Thus, although the child was not a formal claimant in the case (i.e., did not assert an independent “right to be raised”), the Court implicitly recognized the child – as a member of the family unit – as constitutionally situated within the educational relationship protected by the First Amendment. The State may not disrupt or override that relationship.

In conclusion, the Mahmoud v. Taylor decision indirectly reinforced the principle that a child has the right to grow up in an environment consistent with the value system of their family and that the State may neither arbitrarily dismantle nor disregard that environment. The parental right to raise children in accordance with their religious and moral convictions was clearly and unambiguously affirmed as a constitutional right rooted in the First Amendment, safeguarding the practice of religious and ethical education. While the child’s right to be raised according to parental beliefs was not defined as a standalone entitlement, it was effectively recognized as a functional corollary of the parental right. In other words, a child holds a constitutionally protected interest in not being coerced by the State into adopting views contrary to the moral and religious convictions of their parents.

Dissenting Opinions

Academic objectivity requires acknowledgement of the dissenting opinion filed in Mahmoud v. Taylor by Justice Sonia Sotomayor, joined by Justices Elena Kagan and Ketanji Brown Jackson. The dissent is grounded in a contrasting interpretation of the constitutional scope of religious freedom and the relationship between parental rights and the State’s educational function. It also highlights the depth of tension – if not outright conflict – between competing constitutionally protected values and rights.

Justice Sotomayor principally challenged the majority’s assertion that mere exposure of students to differing worldviews – including those expressed in inclusive storybooks – could amount to a constitutionally cognizable burden on religious liberty. In her view, the Free Exercise Clause does not encompass a right to demand that public schools avoid presenting content that may conflict with the religious beliefs of some parents, absent direct compulsion or a requirement to act against one’s conscience. According to the dissent, the majority’s opinion dangerously expands the scope of conscience-based exemptions and threatens the ideological neutrality of the educational system.

Moreover, the dissent voiced concern that granting parents broad rights to exempt their children from particular instructional materials could result in the erosion of equality and anti-discrimination programs designed to protect sexual minorities. Justice Sotomayor further emphasized that the schools in question did not compel affirmation of any beliefs nor require students to engage in conduct contrary to their faith; rather, they merely presented pluralistic content within the context of children’s literature.

In contrast to the majority, Justice Sotomayor also underscored the importance of the Establishment Clause and the principle of viewpoint neutrality in public education. She expressed the view that the Court’s decision unduly privileges religious objectors to the school curriculum at the expense of other students and communal values, thereby disrupting the constitutional balance between religious liberty and the State’s duty to maintain an inclusive, secular educational environment.

The European Legal Context, with Particular Reference to Hungary and Poland

The judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States in Mahmoud v. Taylor, issued on June 27, 2025, ought to be considered within the broader European debate on the autonomy of the family, parental rights to raise children in accordance with their convictions, children’s rights to upbringing, freedom of conscience and religion, and the nature and limits of public education. Although the ruling was rendered within the framework of American constitutionalism, its axiological and systemic foundations – particularly in light of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights – remain highly relevant for European states that strongly affirm the primacy of the family’s educational role, such as Hungary and Poland. This is especially true given that public discourse on the school – parent relationship in these countries is far from settled.

Within the European legal framework, and especially under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the issue of state interference in the upbringing of children engages Article 8 (right to respect for private and family life), Article 9 (freedom of thought, conscience, and religion), and Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 (right to education), which provides that the state: “shall respect the right of parents to ensure such education and teaching in conformity with their own religious and philosophical convictions.”

This principle has been affirmed in the case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR), although the Court grants states a wide margin of appreciation in the field of educational policy. Notable examples include Kjeldsen v. Denmark, Folgerø v. Norway, and perhaps most controversially, Lautsi v. Italy, which drew significant public attention in both Italy and Poland.

Unlike the United States, both Hungary and Poland have ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child (adopted by the UN General Assembly on 20 November 1989), which unequivocally affirms the child’s legal personality and rights within the family and school. Similarly, the constitutions and legislative frameworks of both countries recognize the central role of the family in moral and religious upbringing. Nonetheless, strong ideological and political pressure groups have sought not only to challenge these natural parental rights – entrenched at the constitutional level – but also to amend subordinate legislation (e.g., on religious instruction) in ways that conflict with higher-ranking legal norms. Poland has witnessed such attempts in recent years.

In Hungary, pursuant to Section 9(12) of Act CXC of 2011 on National Public Education: “When conducting educational activities for students concerning sexual culture, sexual life, sexual orientation, and sexual development, special attention must be paid to Article XVI(1) of the Fundamental Law. Such activities must not aim to promote deviation from birth-assigned gender identity, gender reassignment, or the promotion of homosexuality”. A general ban on such educational content was introduced in 2021 through an amendment to the Public Education Act. Consequently, even the express consent of parents does not authorize the conduct of classes in schools addressing topics related to sex education or gender ideology. The judgment under discussion (Mahmoud v. Taylor, June 27, 2025) may therefore serve as a point of reference for the Hungarian government (as well as for Poland) in its dialogue with EU institutions, which have previously criticized Hungarian regulations as allegedly infringing the rights of LGBT+ individuals. The ruling makes clear that the state not only may – but has a constitutional duty to – protect children and families from the imposition of ideologically controversial content in public institutions, rather than facilitating such imposition.

In Hungary, legislation such as the 2021 Child Protection Act explicitly prohibits the promotion of content related to gender transition and sexuality in schools without parental consent. The Mahmoud v. Taylor decision may be cited as a constitutional validation of such policy. The Hungarian government has framed its education policy in terms of “the protection of the child’s best interests” and “the primary role of the family” – an approach that aligns closely with the reasoning adopted by the U.S. Supreme Court. This decision may strengthen Hungary’s (and Poland’s) position in ongoing disputes with European Union institutions, which have criticized such laws as allegedly violating LGBT+ rights. However, the judgment in Mahmoud indicates that the state not only may but must protect families and children from the imposition of controversial ideological content in public institutions – and must refrain from participating in its dissemination.

In the Polish legal order, Articles 48 and 53(3) of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland guarantee parents the right to raise their children in accordance with their own convictions, including religious beliefs. The Constitutional Tribunal has repeatedly affirmed the supremacy of parental authority in education [see cases K 14/03, K 36/02]. TheMahmoud v. Taylor ruling may become a persuasive reference in ongoing disputes in Poland concerning the scope of public school curricula – especially with regard to efforts to expand so-called anti-discrimination or sexual education programs without parental consent.

The U.S. Supreme Court’s decision confirms that even in a pluralistic and secular liberal state, parental rights cannot be relegated to the private sphere or made contingent on the policy preferences of school authorities.For Poland, where ongoing legislative and civic debates surround the limits of school autonomy – such as the introduction of new curricula on health education or the regulation of access to schools by external organizations – these ruling bolsters arguments in favor of meaningful parental oversight over ideological content in education.

More broadly, Mahmoud v. Taylor may serve as a relevant point of reference for constitutional jurisprudence in European countries that recognize the family as the primary educational unit. It affirms that equality, tolerance, and institutional neutrality must not be construed as privileging a single anthropological or axiological worldview at the expense of religious pluralism. For Poland and Hungary, the judgment constitutes significant doctrinal and argumentative support in defense of constitutional parental rights against ideological encroachments in the sphere of public education.

Conclusion

The judgment of the Supreme Court of the United States in Mahmoud v. Taylor merits unequivocally positive assessment as a principled defense of the fundamental right of parents to raise their children in accordance with their religious convictions. In light of an increasing trend toward the ideological shaping of public education, this ruling should be seen as an important memento that freedom of conscience and religion does not cease at the threshold of the schoolhouse.

The Supreme Court observed that the so-called “LGBTQ+-inclusive” books introduced into the elementary curriculum in Montgomery County conveyed a clear normative message – celebrating same-sex relationships and cultural conceptions of gender in a manner directly at odds with the religious beliefs of many families. By denying parents the right to opt out, the school district effectively placed them in the untenable position of choosing between fidelity to their faith and access to public education for their children.

Importantly, the judgment does not negate the rights of students to equality and respect. Rather, it rejects the notion that one constitutional right – here, the school’s asserted right to convey a particular worldview – may arbitrarily override others. The Court emphasized that compulsory education cannot serve as a mechanism for coercing parental acceptance of content that violates conscience and religious belief.

The Supreme Court rightly found that the school board’s policy bore the hallmarks of ideological pressure and created a “hostile” environment for religious convictions – echoing concerns previously addressed in Barnette and Yoder. In particular, the Court noted that children aged 5 to 11 are especially susceptible to internalizing values presented by teachers as moral and normative. Therefore, the refusal to allow exemptions infringed upon the parental right to shape the moral and spiritual conscience of the child.

The judgment also underscored that alternatives such as homeschooling or private education are not viable solutions if they result in financial or social exclusion. The State may not condition access to public education on the forfeiture of fundamental constitutional rights.

Mahmoud v. Taylor should be viewed as a landmark decision affirming pluralism, family autonomy, and tolerance for diverse worldviews. Recognizing the primacy of the parental right to direct a child’s upbringing in accordance with religious beliefs does not threaten the neutrality of the State – it is a necessary condition for it. The judgment restores interpretive balance by affirming that parental liberty cannot be curtailed in the name of institutional “neutrality” that, in practice, carries ideological bias. It may also serve as a counterpoint to prevailing jurisprudence of the European Court of Human Rights, which often privileges “exposure to pluralism” even at the expense of the convictions of religious minorities.