Visions for a Successful Enlargement

https://doi.org/10.63189/MVEB2413

As we move away geographically from the founding states or the ‘core’ it is evident that – except for the 1973 and 1995 enlargement rounds –, the integration of the newcomers by the already Members States and conforming the rules by the candidates or possible candidates became harder and more demanding.^[1] Contrary to this, the premature and politically motivated accession of Greece became the root of serious issues later^[2] and also the accession of the ‘2004 CEE countries’ was a more demanding process on both sides: while those sought for membership had to build a democratic state based on the rule of law and also a functioning economic market after thirty years of communism –, the EU had to contribute to their preparation both financially and professionally.^[3] However, with a retrospective view these hardships were minor compared to those faced by the current candidate and possible candidate states and the 2004 CEE countries had a very distinctive feature compared to the current candidate or possible candidate states: their population was pro-European with high hopes in accession from the very beginning of their newly acquired independent statehood. This enthusiasm was more or less also typical for their governments. In the author’s view this factor was probably the most important in the success of the 2004 CEE countries to access the EU within 15 years of the change of their regimes.  

The 2007 enlargement round already foreshadowed the future hardships: Romania had so many unsolved issues with its judiciary that in its accession treaty the county had to undertake the active post-accession monitoring by the Commission, which became a root of continuous clashes of the Romanian Constitutional Court and the CJEU between 2018 and 2023. The monitoring mechanism, the CVM was only closed in 2023 that is more than 15 years after the accession.^[4] Croatia, which acceded the EU in 2013 carried the burdened past of the Western- Balkan states. However, the country came over relatively smooth and showed a pro-EU attitude: the country cooperated in prosecuting war-crimes and implemented the necessary reform of the judiciary.^[5] On the other hand, Croatia did not settle the border dispute over the Pirani-bay with Slovenia, contrary to the obligation settled in its accession treaty.^[6]

The group of Western-Balkan countries, which now seek membership besides the ‘average issues’ of all the new candidates – namely the lack of independence of judiciary, the partly satisfactory functioning of democratic institutions^[7] – face region specific hardships, though to a different extent: some of them carry the extra burden of the ‘Yugoslav Wars’, which accompanied the dissolution of Yugoslavia. Other Western-Balkan countries too, carry their burdens from the past and had to make sacrifices in order to facilitate their EU membership.^[8] Probably the most important issue is Kosovo, which is not recognised as an independent state by five Member States, two candidate states from the Balkan – namely Serbia and Bosnia and Herzegovina – and by two non-Balkan candidates, Moldavia and Ukraine. Georgia, a possible candidate state does not recognise Kosovo as an independent state either. The author is of the view that the issue of Kosovo has to be settled before Serbia joins, since as the case of the Pirani-bay and Romania’s CVM shows it is really hard to achieve alignment with issues affecting core state powers or sovereignty if they are left open at the moment of accession. As it is elaborated on in the literature, instrumental differentiation is only viable in economic issues, where the freshly admitted members strive to eliminate the differences that rendered the derogations necessary, because doing so is their own interest as well.^[9] However in case of some candidates the issues arise from principles and therefore persistent. As Schimmelfennig and Winzen argue if a country evaluates that accession would require too much sacrifice – e.g. giving up the notion of integrity of the state and acknowledge the secession of a part of the state –  or does not agree with the basic principles of an integration – which in case of Serbia may be assumed among others on the fact that the country does not aligns with the CFSP –, or does not hope economic benefits from participation – since Chinese and Russian inventors offer alternative –, it will most probably refrain from taking part in it. As a refusal of this theoretical assumption, the successive Serbian governments always emphasized their devotedness to accession. However, in practice it is not the theory that fell flat: the words of the Serbian governments are not coincide with their actions.^[10] Even if Serbia’s economy is well aligned with the requirements of the Single Market, the opposing views on certain core values does not offer any good in case of accession and as pointed out by the literature would result in constant value based opt-outs that is constitutional differentiation. The same applies for Türkey – with the longest period of candidate status in the EU’s history –, and for some of the new candidate states. In case of Türkey, the problems are similarly ideological than economical: as the Council noted in 2018 ‘Turkey has been moving further away from the European Union. Turkey's accession negotiations have therefore effectively come to a standstill and no further chapters can be considered for opening or closing […]’.^[11] The current referendum on the amendment of the Moldavian constitution showed low popular support of the population for EU membership, which is in contrast with the actively pro-European stance of the government.^[12] The situation is the opposite in Georgia: while the government displays anti-Western sentiments, the population is in favour of the country’s integration to the EU.^[13]

The potential membership of Ukraine raises serious questions.^[14] While no one can call into question the devotedness of the population and the government of Ukraine for the EU membership, its candidate status based solely on political considerations disregarding the earlier merit-based approach, may cause serious issues in the future. First, if some countries are exempted from the strict criteria applicable to start negotiation process solely on political consideration, then how could the EU credibly demand these from other countries.^[15] Second, from an economic point of view Ukraine would have been seriously unfit for EU membership in the near future even without the war.^[16] Ever since the destructions of the war further increased the problems and the EU funds spent on the recovery are still far from the whole sum estimated by the World Bank.^[17]   

In the author’s view, considering the theories on differentiated integration and the issues of some of the current candidate and possible candidate states, the question is whether it would be more reasonable to abandon the idea of the ever-growing union and instead strive to create a permanent cooperation with these states without considering the membership as the only and final goal. Something that became a dogma in the ‘Maastricht era’.^[18] Leaving the ‘aut Caesar, aut nihil’ attitude opens the road for external differentiation, with a free-trade agreement and a limited access to the Single Market without all the other requirements, which these countries do not want to fulfil.^[19] These kind of cooperations could also help the EU to tackle the ever-growing influence of Peking and Moscow in Serbia without the lengthy and probably unsuccessful negotiation talks. Of course, the doors should be left open for every Western-Balkan state if they wish to enter and has the will to comply with the requirements.

To conclude the momentum of the Maastricht era has blown out, the EU most probably reached the geographical borders beyond which it is not reasonable to stretch. – I wish I will be proven wrong.    

^[1] While two of the 1973 countries – namely Denmark and Ireland – were relatively poor in Western-European standards, they managed to allocate the subsidies well and to successfully catch-up: they are among the richest EU countries by now. [Online]. Available at: https://www.worldatlas.com/gdp/the-richest-countries-in-europe.html (Accessed: 27 February 2025); The 1995 enlargement was a ‘walk in the park’, Austria, Finland and Sweden successfully accomplished all requirements by 1994 that is within less than two years after starting the negotiations. – CoE Archive: The accession of Austria, Finland and Sweden to the European Union.

[Online]. Available at: https://www.cvce.eu/en/collections/unit-content/-/unit/df06517b-babc-451d-baf6-a2d4b19c1c88/ff4dba1b-7691-48a8-b489-51393c82c951 (Accessed: 27 February 2025).

^[2] Angelos, J. (2015) “Why on Earth is Greece in the EU? Reverence for the Ancient Greeks Led to the Modern Greek Crisis”. Politico, 22 June 2015. [Online]. Available at: https://www.politico.eu/article/why-is-greece-in-the-eu-grexit/ (Accessed: 27 February 2025); Karamouzi, E. (2021) The promotion of EEC membership (07.05.2021) [Online]. Available at: https://www.ekathimerini.com/opinion/1160551/the-promotion-of-eec-membership/ (Accessed: 27 February 2025); see also Kalaitzidis and Zahariadis, 2015, pp. 71–84.

^[3] Juhász, 2019, pp. 1–8.

^[4] Benke, 2023, pp. 9-40.  

^[5] Vasiljević, 2025, (under publication).

^[6] For a detailed analysis see: Marinkás and Jecs, 2022, pp.

^[7] See the Commission’s 2024 reports on the candidate and possible candidate states. [Online]. Available at: https://enlargement.ec.europa.eu/enlargement-policy/strategy-and-reports_en (Accessed: 27 February 2025).

^[8] See: Karakamisheva-Jovanovska, 2025 (under publication); Spasenovski, 2025 (under publication); Rakić, 2025 (under publication).

^[9] Schimmelfennig and Winzen, 2020, p. 226.

^[10] The revival of the Pan-Slavic notion, which originates in the 19^th Century. In the second half of the 20^th Century – except for its last decade – the Pan-Slavism was a tool of legitimizing Soviet hegemony and thus lost is rationale due the dissolution of the Soviet Union. In the case of Serbia, however, it has continued to exist in some forms and became something close to Russophilia expressed by the political elite by emphasizing a Serbian-Russian ethnocultural and religious closeness through the concepts of friendship and brotherhood including solidarity, strong national emotions, mutual sacrifice, etc., as Dejana Vukasović and Miša Stojadinović argue. – Ljuboja, 2018, pp. 67-85. 7; Dejana and Stojadinović, 2023, pp. 123-153.

^[11] General Secretariat of the Council, (OR. en) 10555/18 ELARG 41 COWEB 102 Brussels, 26 June 2018 [Online]. Available at:  https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/35863/st10555-en18.pdf (Accessed: 27 February 2025)/

^[12] Corman, 2024.

^[13] Matchavariani, M. (2024) Georgia Postpones EU Membership Talks Until 2028 and Rejects EU Grants 28 November 2024. [Online]. Available at: https://united24media.com/latest-news/georgia-postpones-eu-membership-talks-until-2028-and-rejects-eu-grants-4097 (Accessed: 27 February 2025).

^[14] Henry Kissinger, the former US Secretary of State, proposed applying ‘Finlandisation’ to Ukraine as early as 2014, with the difference that, unlike the original Finnish model, he did not rule out close economic and political cooperation with the European Union. – Kissinger, H. (2014) ‘To Settle the Ukraine Crisis, Start at the End’, The Washington Post, March 5, 2014. [Online]. Available at: https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/henry-kissinger-to-settle-the-ukraine-crisis-start-at-the-end/2014/03/05/46dad868-a496-11e3-8466-d34c451760b9_story.html (Accessed: 27 February 2025); see also de Borja Lasheras, F. (2014) ‘The Finlandisation of Ukraine’, ECFR Alumni 7 November 2014. [Online]. Available at: https://ecfr.eu/article/commentary_the_finlandisation_of_ukraine342/ (Accessed: 27 February 2025).

^[15] Dębiec, K. (2024) ‘Dr Fico and Mr Hyde’: Slovakia’s game with Ukraine and Russia’, OSW Analyses (08/10/2024) [Online]. Available at:  https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/analyses/2024-10-08/dr-fico-and-mr-hyde-slovakias-game-ukraine-and-russia (Accessed: 27 February 2025).

^[16] Iwański, T. (2017) ‘The Stable Crisis. Ukraine’s Economy Three Years After the Euromaidan’, OSW Commentary (05/04/2017) [Online]. Available at:  https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/publikacje/osw-commentary/2017-04-05/stable-crisis-ukraines-economy-three-years-after-euromaidan (Accessed: 27 February 2025).

^[17] According to a World Bank estimation Ukraine would need some 486 billion USD to rebuild its economy. As of November 2024, Ukraine received € 122 billion EU funding from various sources, including the Ukraine Facility and other funds. – The World Bank In Ukraine (The World Bank In Ukraine (31 January 2025). https://www.worldbank.org/en/country/ukraine/overview (Accessed: 27 February 2025); European Commission 2024 fact sheet on EU support for Ukraine: [Online]. Available at:  https://www.consilium.europa.eu/media/rjie2vx4/2024_224_factsheet_eu-action-in-support-of-ukraine_12_november_2024.pdf (Accessed: 27 February 2025).

^[18] Bickerton, C. (2021) ‘The Future of the EU: a Retrospective, ARI 105/2021 (9/12/2021), p. 10. [Online]. Available at: https://media.realinstitutoelcano.org/wp-content/uploads/2021/12/ari105-2021-bickerton-the-future-of-the-eu-a-retrospective.pdf (Accessed: 27. February 2025).

^[19] The Commission’s 2023 communique regarding Türkey could be also cited as an example. In the said document the Commission recommended cooperation with Türkey in certain areas that are important for one or the other side – e.g. helping Türkey in taking care of refugees there – without negotiating issues where the opposing views could not be bridged. – See: European Commission, State of play of EU-Türkey political, economic and trade relations. Brussels, 29.11.2023 JOIN (2023) 50 final.